In search of effectiveness : innovative management techniques in the department of social services by Unger, Jane Ruth
IN SEARCH OF EFFECTIVENESS:
INNOVATIVE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
by
JANE RUTH UNGER
B.A., University of California, Berkeley
(1976)
Submitted to the Department of
Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the Degree of
MASTER IN CITY PLANNING
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
September 1983
c Jane Ruth Unger 1983
The author herby grants to M.I.T. permission to reproduce and to
distribute copies of this thesis document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author:
Department of Urb Studies and Planning
September 1, 1983
Certified by:
Professor Donald A. Sch n
Thesis Supervisor
Accepted by:
Professor Donald A. Schon
Chairman, Departmental Graduate Committee
Rotch
MASSACHUSETS TITOTEOF TECHNOLOY
JUL 21 1983
URARIES
2IN SEARCH OF EFFECTIVENESS:
INNOVATIVE MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES IN THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
by
JANE RUTH UNGER
Submitted to thb Department of Urban Studies and Planning
on July 14, 1983 in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the Degree of Master in City Planning
ABSTRACT
This thesis documents the process by which scientific management
techniques are transformed in the course of their confrontation with
the specific organizational context of the Department of Social
Services, a human service agency which provides social services to
families and children in Massachusetts. The thesis also anaylzes the
appropriateness of scientific management for the human services in
general.
Thesis Supervisor: Donald A. Schon
Title: Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
3TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction
1. Context and Climate
2. Statement of Intent
II. Human Service Organizations in the 1980's:
and Prospects
A. Problems
B. Prospects
III. Case Study: The
A. Introduction
B. ASSIST
C. Standards of
D. The Internal
IV. Analysis
A. ASSIST
B. Standards of
C. The Internal
Department of Social
Practice
Management
Practice
Management
Problems
Services
Plan
Plan
V. Conclusion
Appendix
Footnotes
Bibliography
Page
4
9
9
12
23
23
31
51
64
72
72
85
88
92
107
110
115
4I. INTRODUCTION
1. Context and Climate
Between 1960 and 1973, social welfare expenditures such as income
maintenance, health, housing, education and social services increased
from 52.3 to 215 billion dollars, an increase accompanied by a
shrinking resource base.I "The net effect of these developments has
been to create a politics of scarcity where emphasis is increasingly
placed on choosing from among program alternatives those that produced
the greatest increment of desired social and behavioral change for the
dollar expended. In this context, decision makers, both executive and
legislative, increasingly look to experts who can provide them with
hard information on which to make these difficult choices."2 The
previous emphasis on maintenance and expansion has given rise to
concern with description, control, and evaluation; in brief, the
politics of scarcity has ushered in the "era of accountability".
Accountability is the act of ascertainting and reporting the nature
and effect of one's efforts such that allocations to support these
efforts can be deemed justifiable. It includes identifying the goals,
problems, resources, and technology necessary to achieve organizational
objectives. Accountability also includes making available to funding
sources information such as how funds were spent, who received
benefits, and whether funds were administered honestly and efficiently.
This quest for accountability has been heightened by the recent fiscal
pressure under which human service agencies have been operating,
pressure stemming from federal, state, and local budget cuts.
The culmination of these two developments -- the escalation of
5human service expenditures and shrinking resources -- has prompted
both the reorganization of human service systems at the state level in
an effort to rationalize them, and has also prompted human service
organizations to search for new ways of achieving their objectives
and using their resources more efficiently and effectively.
Efficiency will be taken to mean the "ratio of the quantity of units
produced from a system to the quantity of units put into the system,"
while effectiveness is the degree to which an organization reaches its
objectives which can be stated in terms of output or outcome. 3
Many commentators such as Jerry Turem and Richard Steiner have
argued that bad management has hampered human service organizations'
attempts to adjust to the new call for efficiency and effectiveness.
According to Turem, the "elements of management that are badly
developed in social welfare programs include personnel appraisal
and evaluation based on product and output, not style of work;
accountability systems that account; and information systems that
inform. "4 This growing concern with improved management and its
linkage to organizational effectiveness, has generated interest in
a variety of management techniques, many of which have been developed
in the business sector; these techniques, against the background
of widespread criticism of public sector administration, have been
both admired and widely emulated. The most popular techniques are
those drawn from the schools of scientific management and operations
research, and tend to be analytical, quantitative, and technical.
While it is undoubtedly the case that management is one cause of
the problems facing human service organizations, it is by no means
clear that it is the only or the most important one. Indeed, as the
6next chapter takes up in greater detail, human service organizations
face a variety of problems that may not in fact be amenable to the
solutions posed by scientific management; instead, these problems may
influence the very success of the solutions themselves. Of crucial
importance is the turbulent political and financial environment
which is exacerbated by fiscal pressure and the reality of public
providers as the providers of last resort; the growing strength of
outside pressures such as the courts and diverse constituencies; the
presence of intra and intergroup conflict which is intensified by the
growing demands and pressures; and the specific tradition and history
of each organization which determines its receptivity to change. In
brief, all solutions in general, and the techniques of scientific
management in particular, will be heavily influenced by the
institutional, political, and behavioral environment of the human
service organization with which they interact.
2. Statement of Intent
This study will explore and evaluate the process by which a human
service agency, the Department of Social Services of Massachusetts
(DSS), adopts three scientific management techniques. DSS is a
particularly interesting organization as it is the recent product of
efforts to reorganize the Massachusetts human service system,
specifically the child welfare system, in order to make it more
politically and financially accountable and programmatically effective.
As a new agency in a turbulent environment, DSS is subject to all
the problems and pressures mentioned previously. Its adoption of
scientific management is part of its effort to transform itself in
7such a way as to become a more effective organization. The three
management techniques it has adopted -- ASSIST, a computerized
management information system; the Internal Management Plan, a
management by objective system; and the Standards of Practice,
guidelines for professional practice -- are illustrative of the central
concepts of scientific management, namely the monitoring of performance
through information systems and standards of performance, program
planning by means of pre-determined objectives, and the simplification
and rationalization of work through standards of practice. And it is
because of the close linkages between the central tenents of scientific
management and ASSIST, the IMP, and the Standards, that an examination
of these techniques will yield insight as to the relevance of
scientific management for the human services in general.
My argument is that these techniques are molded and shaped by the
particular characteristics and texture of DSS in such a way that they
become woven into the very organizational fabric they were initially
intended to transform. This essay will focus on the interplay, in an
organization in transition, between these management techniques and
organizational structure, systems of authority and control, and labor
management relations.
The case study has been chosen as the vehicle through which to
explore these issues because it lends itself to the close examination
and, hopefully, illumination of the process by which these scientific
management techniques are transformed in the course of their
confrontation with a specific organizational context. Moreover, the
case study lends itself to careful examination of the process by
which the above techniques were implemented, and thus helps to uncover
8those implementation strategies which were beneficial and detrimental
to their success. In addition, the case format is quite useful as
a base from which to construct general lessons for human service
agencies. The material for the case study of the Department of Social
Services was obtained through a series of interviews with Central
Office staff, and staff of the Regional and Area Offices of Region
IV -- Greater Boston. Samples of these interviews and a note on
interviewing method are contained in the Appendix. These interviews
were supplemented by written material from the Department.
9II. HUMAN SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 1980's: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
A. Human Service Organizations in the 1980's: Problems
The literature cataloging the difficulties faced by human service
organizations, particularly with respect to defining, measuring, and
evaluating programs, is enormous. A distillation of the most important
points will be presented here. One major difficulty is that human
service organizations generally, and treatment organizations
specifically, seldom have certain knowledge of goal attainment and
this makes it difficult to assure the public that one is acting both
competently and effectively. This uncertain knowledge results from
the formidable task of defining effectiveness. There are three sources
of difficulty in defining effectiveness and judging success.
First, "the change goals of each are sufficiently ambiguous that they
do not provide clear guides either for designing strategies or
assessing results. What is precisely meant by "mental health,"
"rehabilitation," and "better social functioning?",2 Second, the
difficulty of operationalizing statement of tasks is compounded by
the uncertainty of the validity of the many treatment procedures, the
consequences of which are only partially demonstratable. "Evaluation
cannot, therefore, as in certain other enterprises, center on the
operational processes of the agency without begging the question of
outcomes." 3  Finally, treatment organizations are deprived of in-
formation about their clients' performance after termination of
client status largely because follow-up studies are so expensive
to conduct.4
The absence of methods whereby effectiveness can be objectively
10
assessed has encouraged human service organizations to act in the
following ways. First, intraorganizational behavior becomes common
whereby change in a client is assessed in terms of responses to
agency expectations and relations with other personnel such that the
model patient is the one who conforms to rules.5 Second, the limited
measures of achievement make it easier to focus on means, and this can
lead to the displacement of goals, and thus overconcern with inputs
6
and secondary objectives like organizational stability. Finally,
it has encouraged adherence to a self-justifying doctrine or belief
system which comes to replace rational objective inquiry and planning.
An "insider mentality" easily develops. To summarize, unlike the
private sector which can demonstrate success through bookkeeping
processes, it has been difficult for human service organizations to
develop measures of effectiveness where expenditures could be related
to output because knowledge about the impact and consequences of
organizational actions is so incomplete.
More general problems arise from the turbulent environment
within which human service organizations find themselves, the nature
of both their finances and constituencies, and staff characteristics.
The turbulence of the human service environment is expressed by the
lack of a well-defined and easily quantifiable market, the un-
predictability of the effects of other organizations, the instability
of resources, and the obligation to provide services mandated by law
even though recipients find them undesirable. By contrast, the
business organization has a market that can be identified and
quantified, predictable relations with other organizations, known
resources which are interchangeable, and products/services that are
11
either desirable, hence produced, or undesirable, hence abandoned. 8
Financial resources of human service agencies are subject to public
policies and come from disparate sources and reimbursement schemes.
These resources are not subject to market forces, and thus do not
rely on consumer taste, needs, desires, or complaints; there is a clear
separation between the person who pays the bill and the person who is
the client. Business organizations have a direct relationship between
the quality and quantity of production and the amount of revenue
generated. 9 The human service organization is. plagued by multiple
constituencies, all of whom have different values, needs, and politics,
while the business organization's constituency is motivated by economic
factors. Finally, human service organizations are staffed by
professionals who have loyalties to their profession and to the client,
loyalties which create the need for discretion and autonomy but which
can complicate monitoring, controlling and evaluating staff performance.
These characteristics make it necessary for the human service
manager to spend greater amounts of time on planning and inter-
organizational coordination, and make decision-making more difficult
due to the fact that "many of the questions and problems which arise in
the human services are not readily amenable to sophisticated analysis,
since they are much more complex, wider in scope, and have far-ranging
social and political implications."10 Moreover, these characteristics
increase the likelihood of inefficient and ill-managed organizations,
especially if the human service manager is not well-trained in
administration which is sometimes the case.
These problems can only be exacerbated by conditions which have
become more prevalent in the 1980's. There has been increased
12
citizen involvement and more intense focus upon local problems thereby
promoting responsiveness to citizen-defined needs. The
administrative process is growing more complex and politicized due to
the involvement of increasing numbers of citizens and the intrusion
of the courts. The persistence of these multiple constituencies will
make it easier to block than to push through initiatives. Funding
sources are also becoming more complex due to the increase in inter-
governmental transfers and the broadened role of state and local
government in resource allocation resulting from the bloc grant
system. In addition, the increasing use of private enterprise in
the delivery of public services will exacerbate the problem of
resource accountability. The unionization of professionals and other
public sector employees will continue. Finally, and most importantly,
the regulatory pressure for accountability and efficiency, even in the
face of serving the needs of the most complex clients (the public
provider as the provider of last resort), will become even greater
in this decade of fiscal restraint.
B. Human Service Organizations in the 1980's: Prospects
Numerous solutions to the difficulties facing human service
organizations have been posed. Because the quality of management
is the one variable which can be influenced in the increasingly un-
certain and complex enviornment within which these organizations
operate, it is not suprising that there is considerable disagreement
over precisely what this would entail. At the risk of simplification,
two basic schools of thought can be distinguished; on the one hand
the administrative management school, and on the other hand, the
13
scientific management school. As the scientific management school is
quickly becoming the more prominent of the two, we will focus primarily
on it. However, for comparative purposes the administrative school
will be briefly discussed.
The Administrative Management School: When interest in more
effective management developed during the 1970's, the social service
profession in particular, was unprepared to deal with the managerial
mentality. "The knowledge and skill, research and trained personnel
needed to respond to demands for more rigorous, and sophisticated
approaches to administration were insufficient." 12 This sparked a
general concern that social service administrators would be displaced
by "generalist managers," and prompted schools of social work to
establish specialized training programs in administration whose task
it would be to develop a model of administration specific to the needs
of social service agencies.
Within the broad field of administrative management, two
orientations can be discerned. The first is the POSDCRB approach of
the 1930's. According to this approach, the manager's tasks consist of
planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting,
and budgeting. POSDCRB also advocates the unity of command and
control, hierarchy, and centralization. The bureaucratic model
formulated by Max Weber shares much with this conception, e.g. a well-
defined hierarchy of authority, division of labor, and a system of
rules. Indeed, the theory of legal-rational authority embodied in
bureaucratic theory informs administrative theory, and both posit
bureaucracy as the most efficient form for complex organizations.
The second orientation is the process or human relations approach
14
which stresses the relationship between organizational process and out-
put. Rennis Likert, a prominent member of this school, describes four
different types of management styles which are designated as levels.
Level IV, or participative management, is the style which produces the
greatest productivity and efficiency, the lowest operating costs, and
the best staff morale. Participative management is characterized by
teamwork and cooperation, widely dispersed decision-making, extensive
group participation and involvement, highly motivated and responsible
personnel, and open communication among all parties. This results in
accurate and complete information because control is spread throughout
the organization and hence there are no incentives for distorted
communication or misinformation. Similar arguments have been made by
members of the human relations school-- Mayo, Roethlisberger, and more
recently McGregor and Bennis--who underline the significance of
relationships among members of work groups and the effects of these
relationships on productivity and organizational effectiveness.
The administrative management school, while clearly not of a
single mind as the previous discussion testifies to, loosely endorses
the view expressed by Rino Patti, a prominent commentator on the
subject of social welfare administration:
"Social work must turn to the task of cultivating a model of
administration that is distinctly adapted to the needs of
social welfare agencies and the norms and values of the
profession. Among other things, the profession must specify
the instrumental values, the means that should be employed
by social agencies to achieve their goals. Accountability
and efficiency, which have loomed so importantly as of late,
are certainly among such values. However, social workers
have also sought to promote the protection of clients' rights
to confidentiality and privacy, advocacy on behalf of unserved
populations, consumer participation, respgnsiveness to community
interests and professional development."
This position that effective administration is necessarily grounded in
15
and adapted to the needs and requirements of social welfare or human
service organizations contrasts sharply with that of sicentific
management which embraces a more generic view of management. A
generic view is appropriate, according to this position, because
the similarity of organizational processes makes it possible for
the manager to apply his knowledge and analytical skills to any
context.
Scientific Management: The school of scientific management has
recently become increasingly popular as a potential source of answers
to the dilemmas faced by the public sector in general, and the human
service organization in particular. Scientific management can be
defined as the effort to plan, standardize, and improve human effort
and productivity at the operative level in order to maximize output.
The underlying methodology is that of instrumental rationality, a view
of the world in which the relations between means and ends is
deliberate and logical such that methods are selected which will most
efficiently achieve ends. Scientific management, coined by Louis
Brandeis in 1910, was both developed and formalized by Frederick
Taylor who was interested in improving work efficiency by increasing
the individual worker's productivity. This would be accomplished by
"specialization of work through the simplification of individual tasks,
predetermined rules to coordinate the tasks, and detailed monitoring
of performance." 14
Scientific management became more prominent when it linked up
with operations research during World War II. According to Herbert
Simon:
"Historically, operations research and management science did
16
not in fact emerge out of scientific management or industrial
engineering. As a sociological movement, operations research,
emerging out of the military needs of WWII, brought the decision-
making problems of management within the range of interests of
large numbers of natural scientists, and particularly of
mathematicians and statisticians... There was soon widespread
fraternization between those exponents of the "new"
scientific management and men trained in the earlier traditions
of scientific management and industrial engineering."l 5
Operations research/management science, which can be used
interchangeably (although some argue that management science is more
concerned with developing general scientific knowledge, while
operations research focuses exclusively on problem solving),l6 is the
"application of orderly analytic methods, often involving sophisticated
mathematical tools, to management decision-making, and particularly
to programmed decision-making." 1 7  Both operations research and
scientific management concieve of the manager as an administrator
who "uses systematic analysis and quantitative techniques to optimize
performance toward certain objectives. The growing sophistication
and development of techniques in mathematics, statistics, economics,
and engineering, together with advancing computer technology, have
provided the primary tools for analyzing complex problems." 1 8 And
it is precisely the fact that scientific management and operations
research offer the promise of rationality, and thus a means for the
resolution of complexity and conflict at a time when "social processes
for making decisions, planning, setting priorities, allocating
resources, and choosing among alternative use of funds are extra-
ordinarily difficult because of the discordant preference patterns
and needs in our highly pluralistic society," that accounts for their
popularity. 1 9
This, growing popularity is attested to by the number of articles
17
found in journals such as Social Work, Public Administration Review,
and Administrative Science Quarterly, articles which both discuss and
often advocate the use of computers, systems analysis, programming,
planning and budgeting (PPB), and management by objectives (MBO).
William Reid, in a not untypical article entitled, "Developments in
the Use of Organized Data," argues that systems analysis, MBO, and PPB
will provide the kind of detailed information about programs that will
allow management to exercise purposive control and direction. 20
Richard Steiner, following Peter Drucker, argues that measures of
effectiveness presuppose the ability to define goals in terms that can
be objectively assessed. Steiner proposes the following process in
order to facilitate goal definition and the establishment of
effectiveness criteria:
1. Determine the function and mission of the organization;
2. Derive clear goals from the mission;
3. Determine targets and performance standards;
4. Select methods for measuring whether performance has been met in
relation to goals;
5. Gather feedback; and
6. Audit and evaluate objecitves and results to determine whether
program met its stated objectives.
In short, by focusing on the relationship between actual results and
anticipated results, it becomes possible to "redirect the organiza-
tion's people, resources, and systems toward goal achievement "21
Management information systems in particular will provide
specific up-to-date data on inputs, costs, and outcomes, and will
replace periodic reports of progress based on "off-hand judgements
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and scattered program statistics." They will also be useful for
program development because they can generate comparative data on
cost-effectiveness.
PPB and MBO have a long history of application in the public
sector thus affording an opportunity for evaluation. In 1960, PPB,
which included elements of operations research such as output and
cost-benefit analysis to provide measures for the evaluation of
short-term performance, was introduced in the Department of Defense
(DOD) to enable it to assess the usefulness and cost of weapon
systems. It is a well-known fact that PPB was not successful in
DOD partly because it generated extensive paperwork and was
accompanied by numerous new rules and regulations. Nontheless, in
1965, PPB was introduced in other parts of the Federal Government,
The results were mixed: "In the few agencies where program
budgeting was seriously tried, notably HEW and OEO, the system
helped decision-makers somewhat to explore costs, consequences, and
alternatives, but the program budget did not affect either the
allocation or the amount of money appropriated., 22
MBO, the predecessor to PPB, also promised more effective (result
oriented) government to be accomplished by measuring actual against
anticipated results and deploying resources accordingly. MBO, like
PPB, has its origins in Taylor's interest in quantification with
heavy emphasis on the capacity to state objectives in unambiguous
terms. MBO also assumes that sufficient information is available for
decision-making, organizations are clsoed and participants are readily
identifiable, and the choice of ob.jectives governs the means to
achieve them.
19
MBO has had mixed success. For example, during the Nixon
presidency,
"Government-wide MBO could more properly be identified as
a strategy for hierarchical control. Proposals were from
lower to higher echelons, but it was up to the boss to
Ac0.-4 A t wn c con C cn aidivance that the boss now had some
clear options and could make known to subordinates exactly
what he wanted... essentially it was a restatement o1
hierarchical accountability with ambiguity removed."' 3
In addition, the characteristics of public organizations, e.g. fluid
environment and external pressures, as well as the possibility that
ambiguity may be necessary for successful public policy, have
hampered the success of MBO. In the human services, the same problems
exist and are joined by the special difficulty of measurement which
makes success more likely in quantitiable areas. On the other hand,
Drucker argues that public institutions do provide results that
can be measured, and others argue that MBO has made better communica-
tion possible because of its emphasis on goal setting and definition.
Computerization is a recent development in the public sector,
but especially in the human services. Computers in the human services
have become more common in the last decade, but are plagued with
problems such as high costs, lack of competent personnel in program
and design, and a pervasive ignorance, fear, and opposition to
computer technology:
"Many professionals maintain this stiff opposition as
they move higher and higher in the human service system.
In fact, certain sections of the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare are dominated by direct prac-
titioners who rose through the ranks and who refuse to 24
apply or even acknowledge the computer's capabilities." 2
A recent review of journal articles on computers in the human
services revealed the types of applications that were most prominent,
The use of the computer for accountability was a recurrent theme -
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"reliable, organized and easily retrievable information that computer
,25technology brings. More specifically, the article found that 80%
of the respondents used the computer for administrative purposes,
13% for educational purposes, and 6.7% for direct service purposes, 26
Computers in social welfare/human services have thus been used
primarily for clerical purposes and routine administrative tasks,
and their use for direct service remains minor:
"Only a single article was devoted to the possibility
of using the computer to assist the social worker directly,,,
there was virtually no discussion of computer support for
tasks invol ijng referral, placement, assessment, and
treatment."L'
According to these authors, this limited use results from a lack of
understanding of the potential of computers in decision-making.
However, there has also been debate about the problems encountered
when computers were used to evaluate social welfare programs. "For
the most part, these problems could be attributed to the difficulty
inherent in measuring and quantifying the intangibles of social
work intervention. "28 Thus we see that the computer, like MBO
and PPB, has also had mixed results when used in the public sector.
Despite the growing popularity of scientific management in the
public sector, its mixed legacy has generated both skepticism and
criticism. These criticisms are of two types. The first criticism
is that the techniques of scientific management are more successful
when a situation is well-structured and routine such as inventory
and product control. That most situations, both private and public,
are not well-structured is recognized by Henry Mintzburg, well-known
for his work on the nature of managerial work. "The management
scientist has sought elegance in his techniques. This may have
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been appropriate so long as he was dealing with highly structured
problems. But those at the policy level are not so neat, and it will
take a long time for him to learn how to structure them."29 Related
to this is the criticism that quantitative data have their limits
and will miss complex and slippery aspects of organizational activity.
Yet, the risk exists that those using these techniques may act as
though they can deal with complexity, thus imposing artificial
precision by screening out that which cannot be made quantifiable,
specifiable, or predictable.30 The second criticism, nicely summarized
by Mintzburg, is that much of what managers do is often not scientific:
"The evidence suggests that there is no science in managerial
work. That is to say, managers do not work according to
procedures that have been prescribed by scientific analysis.
Indeed, the modern manager appears to be basically in-
distinguishable from his historical counterparts. He may
seek information, but he gets most of it in the same old
way, by word of mouth. He may make decisions dealing with
modern technology, but he uses the same intuitive (non-
explicit) procedures or "programs" in making them." 31
Quite often the information system the manager uses is "current,
tangible and non-documented - he designs his own MIS by building
laison contacts and training subordinates to bypass superiors in
delivering information to him." 32  Finally, consensus, bargaining,
and negotiation, the scourge of management scientists, is central
to managerial work, and cannot be replaced by the rational analysis
of costs, effects, and risks.
Criticisms notwithstanding, scientific management has captivated
the organizational imagination; its importance and centrality cannot
be denied. Indeed, scientific management--both its generic conception
of administration and its operations research techniques--has
dominated and threatens to eclipse the model of administration (dis-
22
cussed earlier) which is embedded in the specific features of a
particular organization. Because scientific management has become
hegemonic, it warrants further investigation and evaluation. We
will now examine a specific attempt to apply scientific management
to a human service organization, namely the Department of Social
Services in Massachusetts, a human service agency which provides
social services to families and children. This examination which.
will be informed by the criticisms raised above and the issues posed
in the Introduction, will seek to illuminate the process by which
scientific management techniques are transformed in the course of
their confrontation with the specific organizational context of
the Department of Social Services; it will also seek to analyze
the appropriateness of scientific management for the human services
more generally.
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III. CASE STUDY: THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
A. Introduction
1. Background
The Department of Social Services, a new state agency in
Massachusetts, was selected for detailed examination because i-t affords
a rare opportunity to observe the application of these management
techniques to a human service organization in the process of transition.
The Department of Social Services (DSS) was the product of a long
and difficult battle for the reform of children's services in
Massachusetts. For nearly a decade, the pervasive sentiment existed
that the child welfare system was "fragmented, inefficient, and in-
effective." David Finnegan, the Chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, had championed the idea of massive state reorganization in
1976 whereby a new Department of Family Services drawn from the
Department of Youth Services (DYS) and the Department of Public
Welfare (DPW) would be created. When this proposal was rejected,
Finnegan commissioned a study of children's services in order to
determine the number of children served by the state, the unit cost of
service, and the degree to which the public sector has exercised fiscal
and quality control over these services. This study, known as "The
Children's Puzzle" uncovered the following:
"Seven months ago, you commissioned a task force to conduct
a state-wide investigation of publically supported services to
children. Your initial belief that there exists a tremendous
level of duplication and overlap was found to be absolutely
correct. The cost of that duplication to the Commonwealth
means, that fewer children receive services to which they are
entitled by law, that fewer children receive quality services
that correspond to their individual needs, and that many
children receive no services at all. The human and financial
waste is incalculable." 2
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More specifically, the study found that the profound level of
duplication resulted from the many state agencies with. mandates to
serve children; state personnel were not held accountable for what
they do and accountability in general would only result from increased
central direction; standards for professional practice as well as
capable leadership were missing; and DPW was a mess~-"social services
are drifting out of control. The various social service programs
consist of 63.8 million dollars of purchased services--the cost of
administering those programs exceeds 13 million dollars, During the
past two years, there have been three Assistant Commissioners for
Social Services, a fact that has seriously hampered central policy
and direction. The turnover and turnaround of Central staff has
likewise contributed to a lack of direction for the agency. The level
of morale among the social services staff would be distrubing to even
the most casual observer." 3
"The Children's Puzzle" recommended that DPW be abolished and that
"all social services should be transferred to a new department to be
named the Department of Human Development"; "program and fiscal audit
functions should be combined in each of the agencies serving children",
and "the House Ways and Means Committee should consider establishing
a professional unit empowered to monitor, and occasionally audit,
the federal and state monies expended by public and private agencies
who provide services to children and families." 4  "The Children's
Puzzle" recommendations for reorganization were based upon the need, as
the, study perceived it, for the rationalization of the human service
system. A new and comprehensive state agency responsible for all
children's services would prevent children from "falling through the
25
cracks," yet also yield cost-effective seryice and political and
financial accountability. The managerial methods recommended to
complement and implement this rationalization--a comprehensive manage-
ment information system, detailed monitoring, and fiscal and pro-
grammatic auditing--were implicitly informed by scientifijc management.
This "scientific management" orientation was further developed in the
founding legislation of DSS, particularly the mandate for an infor-
mation system, and also, as we shall see, by the initial planning group
of the new agency. These recommendations were taken seriously at the
State House which appointed the Florence Rubin Commission-composed of
six members, two of whom, Mary Jane England and David Sheehan, later
became Commissioner and Legal Counsel of DSS--to develop a legislative
package.
Meanwhile, in May of 1978, the Gallison child abuse case (handled
by DPW) in which a woman had killed one child and severely abused
another, hit the papers. It was subsequently "learned during the
investigation which immediately followed that the DPW worker in
charge of the case was an inexperienced former junior clerk with a
secretarial school diploma."5 The report blamed DPW, specifically
the presence of "poorly trained and supervised workers, a lack of
long-term planning and monitoring of children in State custody, a
lack of due process and careful case review by the courts in handling
children's cases, a tendency to institutionalize children in lieu of
preferable community-based options, and a lack of case responsibility
as clients are transferred from local area workers to workers on other
levels of the agency. "6
The Gallison case and subsequent negative publicity about DPW
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culminated in the passage of the Rubin Commission legislation on July
22, 1978. This legislation known as Chapter 18B of the General Laws,
established a new department, the Department of Social Services
within wh.ich. the social service functions of DPW would be concentrated.
DSS was mandated to:
"Section 3, The department shall establish a comprehensive
program of social services at the area level and to promote
such program shall divide the Commonwealth. into regions and
areas consistent with those established by the Secretary of
Human Services as provided in Section Sixteen of Chapter Six
A.
(A) In order that the area-based social services be adapted,
organized and coordinated to meet the needs of certain
population groups, the department shall provide programs of
service for:
(1) Families, children and unmarried parents, which program
shall, among other objectives, serve to assist, strengthen and
encourage family life for the protection and care of children,
assist and encourage the use by any family of all available
resources to this end, and provide substitute care of children
only when preventive services have failed and the family
itself or the resources needed and provided to the family
are unable to insure the integrity of the family and the
necessary care and protection to guarantee the rightw of any
child to sound health and normal physical, mental, spiritual
and moral development.
(2) The aging and other adults in need of social, legal, health,
rehabilitation, employment, or other services.
(3) Other population groups which require special adaptation of
the services provided because of special needs.
(B) The department shall:
(1) Formulate the policies, procedures and rules necessary for
the full..." 7
Governor King opposed the new agency, particularly the entitlement
features such as "assist and encourage the use by any family of all
resources to this end,"--the strengthening of families, of which
daycare was the most prominent entitlement feature. Unable to actively
oppose DSS, King appointed Mary Jane England, an Assistant Commissioner
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in the Department of Mental Health (DMH) as Commissioner of DSS, Her
appointment over John Macmanus, As:sistant Commissioner and Director
of Social Services in DPW, symbolized the desire to break completely
with DPW, a desire which underlay much of the new orientation,
structure, and operations of the new agency.8
Chapter 18B already expressed the crucial ways in which DSS would
differ from DPW; DSS was mandated to be decentralized and to have
a comprehensive management information system (MIS). Decentralization
was mandated because the overly centralized structure of DPW whereby
Central Office directed all administrative, financial, budget,
personnel, contracts, monitoring, and program support functions,
hindered it from responding to consumer needs, and thus contributed
to both inefficient and ineffective service delivery. An MIS
was considered important because the information possessed by the state
in general, and DPW in particular, had been judged to be woefully
inadequate. "The Children's Puzzle" first uncovered the fact that
the state did not know the number of consumers it was serving, who they
were, and where they were located. It was believed that an MIS would
provide this information in a comprehensive and timely way.
These concerns were given more substance during the planning
period of the new agency spanning 1979 and 1980. The planning group
headed by Commissioner England also included five colleagues from DMH
in addition to David Sheehan, a lawyer who had been on the Rubin
Commission and would become DSS General Counsel, Alan Frohman, a
management consultant who had been educated at the Sloan School, and
John York., the only member of the inner circle who had a substantial
background in child welfare. He figures prominently in our story
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becaus.e he later became the Director of Region IV, the Region discussed
in the case study. This group articulated the philosophy and the
organizational structure of DSS; its work was influenced by three
crucial factors: antipathy to DPW, experience in the Department of
Mental Health, and the desire to reform social services in such. a
way as to make them cost-effective and efficient yet comprehensive
(entitlement), of high quality, and responsive to consumer needs.
The mission of DSS was first and foremost to strengthen the
biological family which meant a reduction in reliance on substitute
and foster care and decreased use of legal means to remove children
from their homes. Related to this was the promotion of permanency
planning--long term planning with hopes of adoption for children
who must be taken into state custody. Both objectives were part of a
larger nation-wide movement to reduce the use of foster care and
promote stability. Families were to be strengthened by providing
preventive services (counseling and support) in the home to avoid
removing children. To this end, the planning group strived to
"develop an agency that would have a mandate as well as the ability to
provide a good range of preventive and supportive services not limited
to "protective cases" and available to all income groups."9
The planning group operationalized the legislative mandate that
DSS be decentralized. According to the Commissioner, Community
Mental Health Centers grounded in the community and run by Citizen
Boards to ensure community participation, provided the model for
the organizational structure of DSS. The other significant
initiatives--the management information system, later known as ASSIST,
and the Internal Management Plan (IMP) were more fully developed in
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the "strategic" planning sessions in which the consultant, Alan
Frohman, figured prominently. F'rohman suggested that the planning
group treat DSS, a 200 million dollar agency, like a "Fortune 500.
Company" and adopt the kind of strategic planning methods used in the.
business world. This was the origin of the Five Year Plan which mapped
out the long-term needs of DSS and adumbrated ASSIST which the group
decided would be automated, area-based, and on-line. The introduction
of ASSIST pushed the planning group to define its long-range in,
formation needs, needs which ASSIST would help the agency to meet, DSS
needed financial information to determine cost-effectiveness of
service, consumer information to determine the number of consumers
served and their location, information so satisfy government reporting
requirements for grants, and personnel information to monitor agency
progress towards professionalism. With respect to personnel, DSS
requested and received hiring discretion in order to upgrade the
quality of their workforce. To this end, all DPW workers were in-
terviewed to determine whether their credentials were satisfactory. Of
course, this did not endear those workers who were in fact rehired--
82% of them--to the new agency. The planning group also outlined the
system of management to be used, a system which would promote
managerial accountability by clarifying lines of authority and mutual
expectations. The group used a system known as responsibility charting
popularized in the "Harvard Business Review" whereby the manager states
objectives and outlines a method for reaching them. The. Internal
Management Plan was the result.
In summary, the planning group's conception of DSS combined a
strong reform impulse--an impulse exemplified by the emphasis on
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prevention, entitlement, decentralization, and the. general conyiction
to right the wrongs of DPW, with the quest for a new and rational
"scientific" management. The scientific management orientation was
manifest in the readiness to apply techniques developed in the
business sector--management information systems, strategic planning,
and responsibility charting--to the new agency, an attitude suggestive
of the generic management approach. ASSIST and the Internal Manage-
ment Plan epitomized this approach.
2. A brief descriptive note
DSS has a decentralized structure composed of 6 Regional and 40
Area Offices with Area Boards; this structure was developed by the
planning group and heavily influenced by the organizational structure
of DMH:
"Decisions on the working structure of the new Department
were based very heavily on the models that the initial
planners brought with them from the Department of Mental
Health."10
The Regional Offices are the administrative links between Central and
the Areas, and provide all administrative--personnel, budget,
programs--services required by the Areas to carry out the service
delivery process. The Area Offices are accountable for their own
budget and are theoretically to conform their services to the needs
of their communities.
Top Central Office staff (the key leadership group) such as the
Commissioner and the Assistant Commissioners are from the Department
of Mental Health (5), the Office for Children (1), and Senate Ways
and Means (1). The remainder of Central staff have been recruited
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both from DPW and outside the agency altogether, The Regional
Directors, are "generally leaders in the child welfare field," and
five of the six have MSWs."" Finally, 82% of the social workers are
from the, Department of Public Welfare, while supervisors, required to
have Master's degrees, have been recruited from "schools of social
work, private agencies, and individually,"12
In addition to its chief responsibility of handling abuse and
neglect cases DSS also offers the following services to consumers
who have been assessed as eligible; adoption, camping, daycare,
counseling, emergency shelter care, homemaker services, housekeeping
chores, and substitute care--community residential care, group care,
and family foster care.
The Region selected for examination is Region IV--Greater Boston-
which is the largest Region in the State. The primary Area Office
examined is Waltham; staff from the Cambridge and the Coastal Area
Office were also interviewed. While it is certainly not the case
that Region IV is representative of DSS as a whole, it is reputed to
be one of the better run Regions, and thus offers a rich and important
glimpse of the agency at its best. In those numerous instances when
the experiences of Region IV diverge significantly from the general
experience, I have tried to make this clear.
B. ASSIST: Area-based Social Services Information Systems
Technology
1. Background
The commissioner shall develop and implement a management
information system which shall contain fiscal and personnel data,
client data, and program data necessary for the ongoing
administration of effective service delivery. Said information
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system shall include but not be limited to a service plan for
each client, with provisions, for periodic review thereof,
General Laws, Chapter 18
ASSIST typifies DSS' resolve to remedy its predecessor's
management, operational and informational deficiencies,
The Commissioner's Annual Report
October 1982
Soon after DSS was established, the consulting firm of Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell and Co. (PM & M) was retained to evaluate the
computer system inherited from the Department of Public Welfare (DPW),
systems which PM & M subsequently judged to be inadequate. The POS-8
system which pays group and foster care providers was prone to
"overpayments, errors, or fraud." PM & M thus recommended the
acquisition of a more comprehensive management information system.
The legacy of DPW's problems, the recommendations for a new
system, and the legislative mandate, all prompted DSS to develop a new
computerized management information system--ASSIST. This decision
was. supported by the State Legislature which appropriated funds for
data entry operator positions, and by the Federal government which
provided a two million dollar grant.
2. Organizational Structure
A new Office for Systems was created by DSS to assume
responsibility for the development of all computer efforts. Under
DPW, Systems was merely a part of the Program unit for social services;
Systems, i,s now a full-fledged office with its own Assistant
Commissioner and four unit heads, The Office for Systems is organized
into four major divisions: Advanced Systems Design, Systems Design
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and Programming, User Laison and Support, and Systems Maintenance.
Advanced Systems Design is engaged in statewide planning and develop-
ment efforts- which are theoretically to be accomplished through a
user-driven approach in which the specific users of ASSIST such as
the. Office of Administrative Services or the Office for Programs
become central participants in the design of the modules relating to
these areas. The Systems Design and Programming unit is responsible
for developing and maintaining the programs for the new computer
systems, This work is largely carried on by in-house staff in order
to build expertise within Systems, thus avoiding heavy reliance on
outside consultants. The User Laison and Support unit is responsible
for the implementation of new systems. To this end, it develops
methods and procedures for implementation and training, and also
provides technical assistance to field staff through the Regional
Systems Managers. At the request of the Office for Systems, the
Deputy Commissioner of DSS established the ASSIST User Committee,
a forum in which to discuss and make recommendations on issues
affecting the on-going use of ASSIST. The User Committee is comprised
of representatives from all Central Office divisions as well as one
representative from each Region.
The user-team approach to module design and the User Committee
reflects the Office for Systems philosophy that ASSIST be user-driven.
According to this philosophy, the. Office for Systems is to act as a
seryice bureau which incorporates agency needs into computer programs.
In essence, Systems merely facilitates the translation of these needs
into useful technology.
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3. The Planning Process
As previously mentioned, the Office for Systems figured
prominently in the Five Year Plan promulgated during the initial
planning phase of DSS in the summer of 1979, The decision to hiave a
computer system had forced the planning group to consider the broad
range of activities that this system could help the agency to
accomplish, activities related to consumer needs, purchase of service,
personnel, and financial management.
The development of the computer system--ASSIST--began to move
more rapidly during 1980 and 1981 at which time the Assistant
Commissioner of the Office for Systems initiated a series of
conversations with other Assistant Commissioners to get a sense of
what their priorities were with respect to information collection.
These conversations as well as the broad plan articulated in 1979
formed the basis of the Office for Systems contribution to the Five
Year Plan. After the Systems component was formulated, it was
presented to the Systems Policy Group, a special group outside the
Office for Systems composed of the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner,
the Assistant Commisioners, and the Regional Directors. This group
reviewed the plan, established priorities for the implementation
of the modules, and deemed it acceptable. It was then presented
to the Area Directors who also accepted it.
ASSIST was to meet the following broad goals: efficiency of
operational goals; control of organizational performance; and in-
formation to support intelligent planning. More specifically, the
ASSIST data base would have to allow "control access to data, reduced
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redundancy of information, accurate and timely Department-wide
updating, and the ability to develop new applications. such. as
statistics with minimum field effort.' 13  In order to meet these
goals, the Five Year Plan recommended that ASSIST have statewide
on-line retrieval of data meaning that all Area and Regional Offices
would have immediate access to the computer and that data from all
Areas must be stored on the same computer. It was considered
important for the Areas to have access to the central computer
because it is their responsibility to keep the consumer list up-to-
date, and this requires that they are able to add, and change this
information. The IBM 3031 was selected for the task. This computer
consists of a central processing unit, storage units, and an operator's
console. In addition, there are terminals and printers in each of the
Area and Regional Offices which are linked to the central processing
unit by leased telephone lines. The IBM 3031, located in the Bureau
of Systems Operations which is Massachusetts data processing facility,
and part of the Executive Office of Administration and Finance, is on
loan to DSS from A and F. A and F approves all expenditures for
management information systems and prefers that State Departments use
their services. Thus, due to this arrangement, DSS purchased only
the terminals and was able to depend on technical assistance from
BSO.
Seven modules were planned for ASSIST: consumer registration,
consumer tracking, purchas:e of services-contracted providers, purchase
of service-non contracted providers, employee personnel/payroll,
employee staff development, and financial management s.ys.tems, These
can Lie broken down into four subsystems: consumer needs which
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includes consumer registration and tracking; purchase of seryice;
human resources which includes staff development and personnel/payroll;
and financial management. The Plan called for the consumer needs
subsystem--consumer registration and tracking to be developed first
(and at this writing it is the only subsystem whi-ch- has been
implemented) because of DSS' need to know what its actual caseload
was, and who and where its consumers were.
The Office of Policy and Programs was designated as the
official head of the user group for this subsystem; it was initially
conceived that the consumer modules would reflect the model of service
delivery and the definitions of service categories that Programs was
developing in its Standards of Practice, Standards which would
guide social work practice in the field. However, Programs had
effectively been "emasculated by the Legal Department" quite early in
the Department's history for reasons which are quite complex. Briefly,
Programs did not have an Assistant Commissioner until quite late,
and this lack of leadership in combination with ambivalence in the
Commissioner's Office over what the Standards of Practice ought to be,
created a void which the Legal Department quickly filled by sub-
stituting Departmental Regulations for the missing Standards. And at
the time the module design process was getting underway, the Standards
had not yet been completed.
Nonetheless, Programs, in conjunction with the Advanced Systems
Design unit, conducted a requirements analysis, the purpose of which
was the determination of what data the field--Regional and Area
management and social workers--required to enable them to register and
track consumers. The "field" group was composed of three
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representatives, per region, and one- of the representatiyes frqm
Region IV did not think that any Area or Regional Directors were part
of this group which effectively meant that the "fie.ld management"
perspective was under-represented. Central Office staff also played
a major role in this process, many of them came. from the. Department
of Mental Health (DMH), were unfamiliar with the field of child
welfare, and only a small minority had service delivery experience,
The "field" group met for two months-, and in the absence of specific
guidelines from Programs, produced a document outlining the "essential"
data they thought should be collected for the consumer module, The.
domination by Central Office staff and later by the Advanced Systems
Design unit, in conjunction with the absence of guidance from Programs,
acted to diminish the influence of the "field" group in the overall
consumer needs subsystem design process. From this point on, user
involvement became deficient. At the same time that the "field"
group was assembling its data, an outside consultant reviewed the
state and federal reporting requirements that DSS was obliged to
comply with; this data was also included in the module.
In the meantime, because Programs was so indeterminate about what
it wanted to include in the module, and because the "field" group
was not knowledgeable about technical design issues, the Detail
Design Task Force of the Advanced Systems Design Unit "forged off down
a path of its own," and began to make fundamental decisions about
design issues independent of the "field' group, and prior to a clear
articulation of the model and the goals of service delivery, Systems
built the following assumptions into their design of the consumer
module, It was decided that the individual consumer, not the family,
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would be the primary uni.t of analysis; this meant that information
would be collected about the individual consumer, When some members
of the "field" group contested this decision, arguing that the family,
not the individual, was the significant unit in child welfare,
Systems promised that it would be possible to tie the consumer to the
family via family inquiry functions and family events. At this
writing, these do not exist. One major repurcussion of this design
decision has been the difficulty of assembling information on "the
collection of individuals in a family"--the case-which constitutes
the operational unit for the field of child welfare.
Another design element which would have an important impact was
the decision (made during the Five Year Plan) to have an on-line
system, the assumption being that all information is current and
updated due to the fact that it has been entered as soon as it is
available or just as an event occurs. A third feature was the
decision not to accumulate information by supervisory unit, but
rather to have the information flow directly from worker to Central
Office.
This design was then presented to the Systems Policy Group and
the Area Directors for approval. It was not until the Forms Design
Project of April 1982 that the implications of these decisions became
strikingly clear. Incidentally, the third module--Purchase--is being
planned in a slightly different way. The Office of Administrative
Services is leading the user group and is presently soliciting data
requirements from top managers. in Central Office since it is felt
that they will be the primary users of this module. Interestingly
enough, purchase of service has been decentralized and is now the
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responsibility of the Area Offices.
4. Consumer Tracking and Registration: ASSIST ijn Theory
The consumer registration module was designed to contain data
on individual consumers such as identity, marital status, and
location, as well as "events" which describe the consumer's situation
like legal status, case open and close dates, and worker assignment.
The tracking module adds to the event history and also provides
data for "longitudinal analysis of service delivery, service outcome
evaluation, and other statistical uses. " 4  Phase I of the tracking
module includes major case activities that occur during entry, assess-
ment and service delivery; Phase II includes the monitoring of case
reviews and consumer progress.
In addition to these modules, ASSIST can perform the following
functions at the present time: inquiry, update, and statistical
summary. The ASSIST user can do a name search which determines
whether a consumer is previously or currently known to DSS; family
inquiry was to provide a list of family members and give access to
registration data as did the name search but has not been developed at
the present time; consumer inquiry provides registration information
on individual consumers. The update functions consist of consumer add,
consumer update, consumer event add, and event delete. The statistics
function yields case and event counts, while the social worker or
caseworker summary generates a list of cases assigned to a social
worker.
In general', the inquiry functions such as name search and
consumer inquiry into event and registration data for caseload, were
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designed for use by social workers and managers; social workers have
access to their caseloads while managers have access to those of
their Regions and Areas. Within th.e statistical function, only the
caseworker summary was designed for social worker use, In addition to
generating a list of families assigned to a social worker, the. summary
can also b-e used as a management tool to "reconcile the statistics on
the case count and to insure that all consumers are registered on
ASSIST."'15 The remainder of the statistical inquiry was designed as
a tool for Area and Regional management who need caseload statistics,
particularly monthly case counts by area and social workerwhich would
be used to determine staffing patterns. Because cases are given out
on the basis of the number of families as opposed to single-service
cases it is important that this distinction be made, particularly now
that a recent court decision has mandated a 20/1 caseload limit.
Management receives the following output reports from ASSIST: a
weekly listing of social workers by Area with the number of consumers
and families assigned to each worker; a monthly family count by Area
indicating the number of families served by each Area; a monthly
statistical summary report indicating the number of consumers served
by Area according to age and location; a monthly statistical summary of
service events recorded on ASSIST for a given month by Area; a monthly
statistical abuse/neglect report indicating the number of these events
recorded on ASSIST for a given month by Area; and quarterly statistical
consumer counts by ethnicity, legal status, and handicap. In addition,
the expungement report provides a weekly list of those families whose
records are scheduled for expungement on the. 90th day following un-
substantiation or screen-out of a 51A report. This report is useful
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for social workers who are able to select the expungement option best
sluited to the case situation.
None of the above output reports provide the kind of detailed
informati.on that would allow the identification of case by type--
single, child welfare, placement (by type)--information which would
facilitate decisions about staffing and also assist the manager in
monitoring his or her progress towards agency goals like permanency
planning, i.e. the reduction of the number of children in
residential/substitute care by providing permanent arrangements
through adoption or return home.
5. Training and Implementation
Once the consumer registration and Phase I of the tracking modules
were completed and the terminals installed, the ASSIST and case re-
cording forms needed to be designed. It was in the process of
designing the forms--the vehicle through which the consumer modules
would be operationalized--that Programs and Systems came to logger-
heads. The problem stemmed from the incompatibility between a mode
of service delivery based on family units and non-linearity (circular
and non-chronological), and a computer system based on individuals
and linearity (straight and chronological) or "event histories". The
outcome, according to one participant, was "appalling". This will be
taken up at greater length in the following section.
The atmosphere within which the training and implementation
process. took place was one of high expectation on the part of DSS
managers, with the exception of those involved in forms design who
felt slightly uneasy, but particularly so amongst social workers due
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to the fact that ASSIST had been touted as a tool to aid them in their
work. The chapter on ASSIST in the Commissioner's Annual Report of
October 19.82, is entitled, "Management Information Systems; The.
Computer Helps the Social Worker." Another official DSS publication
states that, "the case workers are both the most important data
gathers as well as data users.." According to one DSS manager, this
public relations campaign was launched because ASSIST could only be
successful if social workers would fill out the forms necessary to
feed into the computer. But, on the other hand, workers clearly
needed to perceive ASSIST as useful to them if they were to be
persuaded to use it, and the campaign was geared to this purpose as
well.
Three offices were involved in the training process,; the Office
of Policy and Programs; Office of Human Resources; and the User
Laison and Support unit of the Office for Systems. It was agreed
that the training of trainers model would be used. According to
this model, a preliminary group is trained and trains another group
which then proceeds to train yet another group. This model was
selected over that of a single group of "professional" trainers who
would train the entire Department, for the following reasons. The
Office of Human Resources wanted to increase the number of people who
were capable of training by building this capacity in-house. Secondly,
it was felt that the trainer model would allow the training to be
tailored to the, specific needs of the Areas and Regions. Thirdly,
all the Offices agreed that the smaller scale which accompanied the
trainers model would create an environment more conducive to the
raising of questions and problems. In addition, as a result of budget
43
cuts, many training pos.itions in the Regions had been eliminated, Also
according to one DSS manager (and this is his opinion), the. trainers
model was. decided upon because the Central Office was. "afraid of going
into the areas to train because it didn't know the staff,"
It is important to note that there were really two parts to the
training process. The first part consisted of training in the new
Standards and forms (case recording and computer) about which- more
will be said in the next chapter; convergent with this was the
actual training in the use of the ASSIST hardware, hardware which
had arrived in the Regional and Area Offices of Region IV during
January of 1982, six months prior to the Standards and Forms training.
The first training session for Part I of the Standards and Forms was
held at Buzzards Bay during August of 1982. The participants were
sent by the Regional Directors and tended to be clinical directors in
the Area Offices like Supervisor II's and Area Directors, as well as
regional staff. This group was trained by Central Office Staff from
Programs and Systems, and would then go into the Areas to train. In
the case of Region IV, a second training session was held for those
who could not attend the Buzzards Bay session. This consisted of a
one day meeting held in Newton during September of 1982. Those from
Region IV who trained at Buzzards Bay led this training session. The
Waltham Area Office sent four staff to this session, and they in turn
conducted four days of training in the Area Office.
Th.is training of trainers model was heavily criticized by those
in Region IV who participated in it. Common complaints from Regional
systems staff, Area Directors, superyisors, and social workers.,
focused on the fact that trainers were not well-prepared, and could
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not always answer all the questions: that were directed at them, There
was a general feeling that too much material was presented in too
short a time, and that follow-up sessions were necessary. It was
suggested that a group of profess-ional trainers, part of neither
Programs nor Systems, should have conducted the training to insure
uniformity in the training process.
Regional Systems staff played a large role in the actual
training and implementation of ASSIST hardware. They provided hands-
on training on the computer terminals to Area Directors, supervisors,
and social workers, and were also responsible for training the
data entry operators in the data entry procedures, In Region IV not
all staff were trained to use the computer, and the selection of those
who would be trained had a rather random quality about it. There
were those staff at both Central and Area who resisted learning for
reasons ranging from, "I don't have time to play around and teach
myself," to "I hate computers." Clearly, the original hope that
all DSS staff would become conversant with the computer has not
materialized, Of course, there was considerable Regional variation
in the hardware training process, and the Office for Systems did
not originally intend for every staff member to have explicit
computer training. However, if all the staff had been trained on
the computer hardware, they might have been more comfortable with it,
hence more willing to use it.
Regional Systems staff has also provided technical assistance
to the Area Offices. For instance, if a computer problem occurs
that cannot be corrected by the operator, a call is placed to Regional
systems which will instruct the Area to make further calls to Central
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Systems or to the technical support unit of BSO, The Area then enters
the problem on the Trouble Log which is mailed to the User Laison
Unit of Office for Systems. Moreover, the Regional Systems managers
(chief systems manager at the regional level) are part of the Regional
Sys~tems Group which meets every two weeks with Central System managers
to discuss operational problems with the Computer.. It i.s in this role
as laison between Central and the Areas that area problems are
transmitted to the Central Office. In its laison role, Regional
Sys~tems also passes along directives and instructions from Central,
Every Region has a representative on the ASSIST User Committee,
formed in November of 1982 under the auspices of the User Laison and
Support Unit of the Office for Systems to provide a forum for the
discussion of issues, problems, and proposed changes relating to
ASSIST. The Committee, which meets once a month, is, in theory, to
be composed of individuals from outside of Systems, For example,
the representative from Region IV is a manager in Programs at the
Regional Office. However, most Regions have sent their Systems
Operators--the top systems managers--as representatives. Central
Office is also heavily represented on the Committee.
Although some members of the Committee have attempted to raise
fundamental questions about the design of ASSIST and what its purpose
should be, the meetings are usually so well-structured, more so after
a particularly unwieldy ses-sion where these issues were raised,
that this kind of disucssion has been inhibited, The Committee
rarely initiates changes but usually responds to proposed changes
made by Systems, changes which must go through this Committee before
they can be translated into designs by the Advanced Systems Planning
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unit. Complaints from the field about the nature of the output
reports and the amount of paperwork generated by the forms, are. also
raise.d in the Committee, and Systems, which keeps catalogues of
these complaints, explains to the Committee why some can be corrected
and some. cannot. As of this. writing, the entry forms are being
revised, but the Committee has- not seen a draft of the revisions,
and some minor attempts have been made to condense the forms, attempts
which can only meet with limited success if information continue-s to
be generated for the individual consumer.
The representative from Region IV in conjunction with the Regional
Director determined the means by which the representative would
communicate with the Areas. It was decided not to have a Regional
ASSIST User Committee in Region IV but to use existing forums for
discussion of Systems issues. The following forums have been used:
Area Directors monthly meetings which the representative attended;
monthly meetings with in-take personnel and screeners who were the
first to apply the new Standards and Forms on entry; and monthly
meetings with Supervisor II's who are the assistant Area Directors
in charge of clinical practice. It was felt by the representative
that these meetings were adequate to receive feedback from the Areas.
In addition, the representative visits Area Offices on a monthly
b.asis to check case records in order to determine whether or not
they were being filled out correctly. In this way, the representative
is., in theory, able to gauge the level of understanding with respect
to the Standards and Forms. In turn, the representative s.ends memos
and copies of reports generated by the User Committee back to the
field; Area Directors and Supervisor IIs are usually the recipients
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of this. information which they presumably share with, their Area staff.
In addition, each Area Office has an Area Systems Contact who is
the key person to provide feedback on ASSIST forms to Regional
Systems:, In Waltham, the Supervisor II performs this function, In
theory, Central Systems then works with Region IV':s User Committee
representative to "ensure that area comments and recommendations
concerning redesign are addressed," While it is the case that the
User Committee representative does communicate with Regional Systems
and sometimes finds out about major "operational" problems in Areas,
the representative did not thi'nk that the Area Systems Contacts
actually existed, and remains skeptical about the ability of the
Committee to respond to "recommendations concerning redesign,"
5. Everyday Life Under ASSIST: ASSIST as experienced by Data
Entry Operators, Field Managers, Social Workers, and Central
Office
Data Entry Operators
In October of 1982 when a data entry operator sat down at a
computer terminal to do a name search, it took anywhere from thirty
minutes to a few hours for the information to appear on the screen.
Many were forced to work before or after the normal working day.
This was the beginning of the "slow response time" problem that has
continued to plague ASSIST. Unfortunately, the capacity of the
computer was overestimated by the technical staff at BSO; DSS has
already used up the core with only their first subsystem in place.
Next month they will receive anothe.r computer with greater capacity
and this should relieve the problem.
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Field Managers: Regional and Area Directors. and Supervisor Iis,
Field management was generally enthusiastic about the possib.ility
of a management information s-ystem that would allow for the
manipulation of data in a variety of ways to aid in decision-making
and the monitoring of their work environment, In particular, Regional
and Area management wanted caseload information for staffing, service
delivery figures s.uch as the number of children in group and foster
care, and the kinds of support services, e.g. homemaker, counseling,
daycare, that were being provided. The Director of Region IV had
hoped that ASSIST would help him to monitor the goals set forth in
the quarterly Internal Management Conferences such as permanency
planning which requires detailed information on the composition of
the Regional caseload. However, the output reports generated by
ASSIST are basically weekly and monthly counts of cases and these
numbers "don't mean anything to anyone." At present, ASSIST cannot
help the Regional Director to track the number of children in
substitute care, an arduous task which is done manually by the
$uperyisor IIs in the Area Offices. In fact, he is in the process
of refining his manual system precisely because of the precision and
detail it affords; at his request, the Supervisor Is manually
compile the monthly statistical case count which the Areas submit
to the Regional Office, a count which could be done on ASSIST except
that he wants it broken out by counts of cases by type per worker
(voluntaires, referrals, adult), placements, and total family counts,
Another persistent problem with. the ASSIST output reports is that they
are seldom up-to-date, a problem which was to be remedied by giving
field managers "turn-around" reports---written reports which the
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social worker can update and give to the DEO for re-entry, These.
promised reports have not yet been delivered, and managers h-aye
been devising their own forms for this purpose. The Office for $ystems
is. aware. of these difficulties and is presently- doing its best to
remedy them. New programs can be.written which. will allow for -more
detail.
Social Workers and Supervisors
ASSIST will help social workers provide the services necessary
to help maintain intact families, reunite separated family
members, and provide each child with a permanent home,,, will
help workers organize their caseloads, make available pro-
files and trends within their caseload and the community,
aid in the consolidation of paperwork, and support compliance
with government reporting requirements. 16
There is a pervasive sentiment among social workers that ASSIST
has not helped them to perform their jobs--the delivery of services
to consumers--but, on the contrary, has interfered with this, The
primary foe is the computer forms which must be filled out, forms
which "take time away from casework" and are considered an extra
chore to be done. Social workers carry all of their case information
in their heads and in the case record, and therefore feel that they
are merely duplicating the case record onto the ASSIST forms, an
activity that has not generated the benefits promised. According
to one. supervisor, "at least the case record captures whats really
going on in the case, you don't just check boxes."
The rhythm and mode of the social workers' worklife is at odds
with that of the computer. ASSIST and its accompanying forms are
designed for data to be entered just as it happens and in a certain
order, yet social workers enter data periodically when they get
the chance. Moreover, service delivery tends to be more messy and
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acti-vities less chronological than the computer design allows fQr;
the "life of a case" may be more circular than linear,
The information generated by ASSIST, for example, the social
worker summary, has been unhelpful because, as previously mentione.d,
social workers already have this information in their heads; they
know what their cases are. Supervisors., on the other hand, find
this more useful. The summary could be more helpful to social
workers if it specified case by type and also proyided names and
addresses of family members as well as type of family. Social workers
would also benefit from a registry of types of placements available
which. would greatly expedite the matching of consumers to facilities.
They would also like to have computer face sheets containing crucial
identifying information for the front of each case record, Some
suggested that clerks be hired to fill out the computer forms, and
all have requested a condensed case record as well as a reduction in
the number of pages per family generated by ASSIST, a virtual torrent
that complicates rather than streamlines their files.
According to one SupervisorII, ASSIST has had a negative impact
on worker morale both in her office and across the state because of
the additional work unaccompanied by immediate benefits. There
has, thus far, been little discussion in the literature indicating
that social workers can derive direct benefits from management
information systems; they continue to be indirect users and to
derive indirect benefits. However, had the process of user
participation inDSS been more successful, some of the design problems
mentioned which affect social workers might have been avoided, Also,
the suggestions outlined above could easily have been operationalized
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and fortunately remain possible enhancements to ASSIST, The
difficulties surrounding the forms and the paperwork burden will
prove far more intractable; they may not be solvable without major
systems alterations. As. of this writing, none of the aboye suggested
changes. have been implemented, although the forms-aLuse and neglect-
are in the process of revision. The slowness of the revision process
has caused many to feel that their "complaints go unheard normally."
Their User Committee representative, whom some did not know existed,
says that the changes social workers want, specifically reductions
in the numbers of forms, cannot be made without redesigning the
whole system. In the meantime, their indifference and hostility
to ASSIST grows.
Central Office
Central Office is the most pleased with ASSIST which. has proven
helpful in generating the counts they need. It is true that accuracy
has been a problem, but ASSIST makes it much easier to get the kind of
summary statistics that are useful for decision-making and compliance
with government reporting requirements. ASSIST has become an
important tool for compliance with the Lynch Order by producing a
report which identifies completed service plans and case reviews, and
has also helped with staffing levels.
C. Standards of Practice
1. Background
The Department of Welfare (DPW) had seven volumes of Standards,
which, according to one social worker, no one actually read or
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followed with any degree of regularity. When DSS Lecame operative,
one priority was. to write new Standards which reflected the enabling
legislation, regulations, and the major goals of the agency. The
Standards, derived from DSS regulations, give the regulations
specific form and content; they act as a working document for field
staff to guide their practice. "The Department's Standards of
Practice define the requirements of the service delivery process and
estab.lish minimum expectations for good practice in the field,"17  The
Standards should help to promote a standardized quality of service
delivery by making the requirements of this. delivery clear.
The Central Office of Programs and Policy assumed responsibility
for writing the Standards. As indicated earlier, Programs and Policy
got off to a late start partly because it did not have an Assistant
Commissioner until February of 1980, quite late in the planning
stages of the agency. A first draft was completed in June of 1980,
but rejected by the Commissioner as inadequate because it was not
"a concise statement conveying the basic philosophy and principles
of the Department's new approach."18 The draft, according to the
Commissioner, was too detailed and thus did not sufficiently
"empower" workers, who as professionals should be able to use their
judgement in meeting the broad goals of the Department. The other
position on the Standards reasoned that workers needed very detailed
Standards because DSS was a new agency and therefore had a
responsibility to clearly indicate where DSS policy and regulations
differed from those of DPW. A certain amount of guidance was necessary
to implement the regulations, and workers did want to know what they
would be held accountable for; indeed, according to some in this
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camp, workers both required and wanted "cookbooks", Workers them-
selves were ambivalent about the kind of standards they wanted,
While all wanted some kind of guidance, (especially since DSS was
a new agency) some workers preferred more detail than others,
This latter position eventually prevailed, and a quite detailed
set of Standards was written. The Standards were formulated to be a
methodology of how to deliver services in the field, It was
beli.eved that following the Standards would improve case management,
and improved case management meant more efficient service delivery,
Essentially, the Standards became a way of managing the service
delivery process by functioning simultaneously as a management tool
and guidelines for practice.
Part I of the Standards - entry, assessment, and service plans
was in draft form by 1982; Part II will cover service provision,
substitute care, case review and case closure,
When Part I was ready for review, each Region set up Regional
Review Panels composed of inside and outside reviewers which met in
three all day sessions. During the review process, the controversial
points, problems, and criticisms that surfaced were compiled into
written reports and incorporated into subsequent drafts of the
Standards. Local 509 of the Service Employees International Union
which represents DSS employees,19 also had an opportunity to review
the Standards through its Standards of Practice Review Committee.
The Standards occupy an important place in labor management
negotiations, and in this way, the Union operates as a channel through
which feedback on the Standards is communicated to the Central Office,
The new Standards and ASSIST required the design of new forms
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and the redesign of many of DPW's forms. The Forms Desi.gn Project
which begain in April of 1982 had the. purpose of designing a new
case recording manual to accomodate the documentation required by
the Standards, as well as the computer forms to accompany the
Registration and Tracking modules of ASSIST, As mentioned in the
previous section, the Standards; and the Consumer Needs Subsystem of
ASSIST were initially designed to correspond to each other, but the
delay in the Standards created a disjuncture between the Office of
Programs- and the design unit of Systems which effectively insulated
Systems from the requirements of Programs. Th is implicit conflict
b.ecame explicit during the Forms Design Process, when both the, Central
Offices of Systems and Programs battled over how to operationalize
the modules; this was compounded by the fact that there was little
agreement in the field as to how the forms should be designed because
the Areas has always used slightly different forms, thus no single
model or set of guidelines existed.
A Forms Design Committee, composed of three representatives per
Region chosen by the Regional Directors, was given this task. The
Union also sent two representatives to the Committee because the
Forms would have such a significant impact on the work process, Six
drafts were produced, the fourth of which was presented to Area
Directors for comment, comments which were integrated into subsequent
drafts. The Forms were so awful, according to the representatives
from Region IV, that they decided to prep their Area Directors in
the Forms. thus enabling them to go to the statewide Area Directors
meeting where they pushed to make the Forms more amenabLle to service
delivery in the field, Some case recording pieces were changed,
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but the ASSIST forms could only be slightly altered because the
des.ign of the modules, indeed the. system as a whole, dictated that
the forms have a certain architecture, one which could not be changed
without substantial alteration in the computer system as a whole,
Training in the Standards and Forms occurred in August and
September of 1982 as described in the previous section, Implementation
began in September, and the period between October 1 and December 1
was designated as a statewide testing period. in which problems
arising from the. Standards and Forms were addressed, After the
implementation proces:s, representatives from the Office for Programs
and the Office for Systems went to the Regional Offices and requested
that the Regional Directors in conjunction with Area Directors
implement a process whereby feedback from the field could be
solicited. It was decided by Central not to use a standard
questionnaire. This resulted in the feeling among social workers and
supervisors that they were unable to communicate directly with the
Central Office.
After the testing period was over, the Office for Systems
compiled a catalogue of complaints, criticisms, comments, and
suggestions which they presented to the Area Directors in a statewide
meeting held in Hyannis in March of 1983, the purpose of wh-ich was to
explain why some changes had been implemented and others not. The
Area Directors upon returning from this meeting each used a different
method of communicating th.is information to their staffs.
The entire Standards and Forms process generated criticism from
direct line workers and supervisors, who felt that as the primary users,
they did not have enough direct involvement in the design of either.
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According to one supervisor, Central Office 'should have observed us
to see what it is we actually do," Moreover, because so few changes
were actually made as explained earlier, many workers felt that their
s-uggestions and criticisms had neither been listened to nor acted upon,
2. Permanency Planning: The Standards in Action
Permanency Planning, the attempt to reduce the number of children
in residential care by providing permanent arrangements either through
adoption or return home, is a major goal of DSS. It is a response
bnth to the fact that "DPW was criticized for using foster care on
a permanent, not a temporary, basis and with failing to try to
prevent such placements, failing to monitor the status of children in
care, and moving too few children into adoptive homes,"20 and to
the importance placed upon permanency planning concepts by Federal
programs such as Title IV-E. DSS regulations and Standards of
Practice embody the concept of permanency planning by requiring
written service plans and service reviews emphasizing re-unification
goals every six months; 21 full case reviews every six months for all
children in placement to determine the need for continuation; improved
screening and needs assessment at entry in order to promote appropriate
placement; and supervisory monitoring of assessments for quality and
accuracy. The Standards relating to permanency planning and all other
activities which fall under entry, assessment, and service plans, have
the purpose of raising the quality of service delivery by guiding case
management practices. The Standards provide very specific and detailed
instructions about how to perform an activity, instructions which
breakup every activity into small pieces, thus rendering the activity
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easier to complete and encouraging compliance with. the $tandard, Even
though the Standards attempt to structure activittes very carefully
in order to promote a level of quality and compliance, "they do not
guarantee good work"; supervision remains necessary,
Most of the supervision occurs at the Area level, the nature of
which. varies among Area Offices. In the Waltham Office, all major
events must be authorized by the Administrative Review Team, composed
of the Area Director, Supervisor II, program specialist, business
manager, s-upervisor, and social worker presenting the case for
discussion. The ART meets weekly to review all placements, case
closures, and court actions contemplated by social workers. In
addition, supervisors check case records to determine if they have
been filled out accurately and thoroughly. Case records, the major
written record which, among other things, serves as a means of
evaluating services provided to consumers. The Supervisor II checks
case records for content and specific compliance with procedures such
as case review, and in this way directly monitors the work of the
social worker and indirectly monitors the quality of the supervisor's
training of the social worker in the use of the case record. The
nature of supervision in the Waltham Office is somewhat collegial
because it occurs in conference settings. The Area Director makes a
point of seeing herself in partnership with her staff: "You can't
impose or just shove things on people because they are professionals."
However, supervision from the Regional or Central Office when it does
occur, is not perceived as collegial, but authoritative, partly
b.ecause staff have such little contact with Central Office, yet are
expected to implement the policies formulated there,
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3. The View from Below
The new Standards have generated much controversy and criticism
among social workers and supervisors. This criticsm has crystalized
around the. following issues: workload, the shift from clinician to
casemanager, discretion, and supervision. A universal complaint is
the amount of work that has accompanied the new Standards, According
to one s.ocial worker, the amount of work actually doubled for any
given event due to the explicitness of the steps to be followed and
the amount of accompanying documentation required. For example,
abuse/neglect screeners could not keep up with in-coming calls
because they had more information to process with each call, The
explicit and demanding nature of the Standards, in combination with
high caseloads, makes it impossible to comply with every point in the
Standards. Particularly difficult are the deadlines associated with
abuse and neglect cases in which written emergency investigations
must be completed within twenty-four hours; non-emergency investigations
within seven days; and full case assessments within thirty days after
the opening of a case. The rigorousness of the abuse/neglect Standards
was a response to previous negligence on the part of DPW, but more
recently to the Mallet case in which a child in the care of DSS was
murdered. The Mallet case starkly illustrated just how vulnerable
and liable social workers are, and made many social workers appreciate
the explicit and rigorous nature of the standards pertaining to
abuse and neglect.
The paperwork generated by the new case recording manual, the
ASSIST forms, and the requirements set out in the Standards for full
documentation, makes the workload seem even heavier. There is a
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pervasive feeling that the Forms are redundant, especially the
computer forms which essentially duplicate major parts of the case
record onto the computer. This contrasts with the promise that:
The new- forms will help workers organize their case recording
activity. They will standardize the information necessary
for records of entry, assessment, service plans and case review,
They will also improve the quality of service plans and make the
plans- uniform and consistent. Designed to be simple and easy
to fill out, they are a move in the direction of eliminating
unnecessary paperwork, They are designed to minimize collection
of redundant data and integrate collection of manual and
automated data. In short, the forms will provide a structure
for reliable, systemati information gathering both in case
records and on ASSIST.22
There has also been concern with what is perceived to be a shift
in the definition of social worker, implicit in the Standards of
Practice, from that of clinician to casemanager. As a casemanager,
the social worker plugs clients into services attempting to avoid
duplication, meets deadlines, fills out forms, makes fewer clinical
decisions, and sees clients less frequently, who, according to one
social worker, "suffer because we as workers and clinicians cannot
be there for them as before." The neglect of thier clinical skills,
skills which they view as the basis of their professionalism and as
an integral part of their job, has contributed to the feeling that
being a casemanager is a lot like being a clerk. On the other hand,
case management is an integral part of the purchase of service system
whereby DSS contracts for services with private providers rather than
providing them in-house. This type of arrangement transforms the role
of social worker into a casemanager whose primary responsibility is to
ensure that clients are linked up with appropriate and available
services.
According to social workers, the fact that the Standards are
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"rigidly enforced" through a system of supervision "takes the
professionalism out of the job." Even at the. Waltham Area office
where a "collegial" style of supervision predominates, social workers
feel that they are constantly being monitored through. the administrative
review team, case conferences, and other monitoring devices -people
are there and you have to answer to them." For example, the Area
Director's signature is required in order to proceed with activities
such- as- case closure or court orders, which, according to one
supervisor, could just as easily be handled by the social worker or
the attorney. This scrutinization can be partly attributed to the
fear that cases are not being adequately reviewed, a common
occurrence during the DPW days; it also stems from the desire on the
part of top management to ensure that the principles of permanency
planning are being implemented. In addition, a social worker must
receive supervisory permission to do "counseling" with a client. In
essence, the area-based system of service delivery put discretion
into the hands of the Area Director, but not necessarily into those
of the worker. On the other hand, workers often feel neglected by
management because they are not praised for the good work they do.
These concerns have been exacerbated by the effort to comply with
the Lynch Order handed down by Judge Keaton in September of 1982.
In 1978, Patricia Lynch filed suit against DPW for putting children
into foster care unnecessarily. On September 20th Judge Keaton handed
down an Order stating that DSS must comply with case plan, case review,
caseload and case assignment requirements in order to be eligible for
Title IV-E funds (Adoption Assistance and Foster Care funds for AFDC
eligble ch-ildren). On December 30, 1982, DSS filed a Title IV-E Plan
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which was accepted by Health and Human Services, on February 8, 1983,
It was agreed that DSS would comply with the Title IV-E Plan by-
February 1, 1983, giving the Department approximately two months
to comply with the following requirements: All AFDC children in
out-of!home placements had to have service plans and case reviews,
a requirement which DSS extended to all children in out-of-home
placements as well as cases resulting from substantiated abuse/
neglect reports, Case reviews, in particular, were to be done:
Within six (6) weeks of the placement of a child in
substitute care, a limited case review must occur.
- Six (6) weeks after that initial review, that is, three
(3) months after the child is placed, a limited case
review must occur.
- Within six (6).months of the date of placement, a full
placement case review must be completed.
- Thereafter a cycle of limited case reviews alternating with
a full review three (3) month intervals should be followed
until the case is closed or the child is no longer in
placement.23
It was the full placement case review that had to be completed for
most cases in order to be in compliance with the Order; a third party
not involved in the case and the parents must also be included in
this process. In addition, all cases were to be assigned within
twenty-four hours, and caseloads could not exceed 20/1.
The need to implement the Order in a short period of time put
enormous pressure on the Central Office which immediately took charge
of the compliance effort. Central Office relied upon its direct line
authority over the Regions and Areas, authority which was expressed in
a continual stream of directiyes and instructions as well as through
the development of mechanisms for monitoring activity in a much more
detailed way, Central Office established a Compliance Team composed
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of the Deputy Commissioner, th.e Commissioner's. Executive Assistant
and the Commissioner. The Commissioner "reserved for herself the
overall responsibility to issue clear directives to all DSS staff
to comply with the Order." 2 4
At the Regional level , the Regional Program managers, normally
re.spons.i'b.le for implementing programs and policies at the. Area level,
were instructed in the new- directives by the Compliance Team which
attended their meetings in order to "assure that a consistent
25
mess.age was. transmitted to the fie.ld"25 Area. Directors were required
to develop workplans "demonstrating the steps each Area would take to
ens.ure that there would be service plans and case reviews for all
children in placement and in protective cases." 26 These plans were
consolidated into regional work plans which were evaluated by the
Deputy Commissioner. Technical assistance was provided by both
Central and Regional staff to Area Offices. This assistance took
the following forms. Reviewers were dispatched to Area Offices to
read service plans and case reviews which they then commented upon
either verbally or in writing. Regional Offices provided information
and acted as trouble shooters for any type of problem that arose.
Region IV, in addition to providing Area Directors with help in
developing workplans, guidelines, and monitoring reports, twice sent
Regional staff to each Area Office to conduct reviews of case records
and service plans. "At each site visit, conformance to the Department'-s
service, planning and case review requirements was assessed, progress
monitored and verbal feedback proyided to Area Directors and Supevisors.
When necessary a corrective action plan was developed and followed up
on by Regional staff, "27
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Compliance with the service plan/case review part of the. Lynch
Order was very difficult for the-whole agency, but partilcularly so
for social workers, many of whom actually did this paperwork during
afte.rwork hours. The nature of the compliance effort, especially
Central and Regional monitoring of case records, the results of which
were not directly communicated to workers, added to the feeling among
many that they had little control over the. policies and procedures
which they were expected to implement, 28
All of these issues--overly rigorous Standards of Practice,
paperwork, high caseloads, and the additional pressure of the
compliance with the Lynch Order--culminated in a demonstration by the
Union in January 1983, the theme of which was "People not Paperwork".
This demonstration was indicative of the low morale and discontent
among DSS workers, discontent that had been brewing from the very
inception of the Agency. According to the Commissioner, these feelings
among social workers are the result of their vulnerability now that
they are liscensed and thus liable for their actions; the "empowerment"
of social workers is as the root of their discontent.
On the one hand, one could argue that the Standards as well as
compliance with the Title IV-E requirements helped to make service
delivery more efficient by forcing immediate implementation of
service plans and case reviews, thus compelling the kind of case
management practice which leads to permanency planning, On the other
hand, the hardships accompanying both of these measures has also
diminished the morale of the workers, who argue that they would be
more efficient if they had fewer forms, more time to do "clinical"
work with their clients, more training, and fewer abrupt changes in
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pol i,cy.
D. Internal Management Plan (IMP)
1, Background
The. organizational structure of DPW was extremely centralized
with budget, personnel and policy authority all residing at the
Central level. The Central Office however, had no direct line
authori.ty over the Area Offices., and the Area Offices, denied budget
and pe.rsonnel authority, had no incentive to manage, This created
two problems: continual deficits and an absence of control and
accountability. The decision to have a decentralized area-based
organization in which the Regional and Area Offices were to have
responsibility for budget accounts, contracts, and human resources,
with the Regional Office acting as the administrative liason between
Center and Area, was in part a response to this centralization. The
Internal Management Plan (IMP)--quarterly management conferences held
between Central Office and the Regions, the Regional Offices and the
Areas--is the institutional mechanism which both links the various
organizational levels of DSS together, and provides management at
these levels with the incentive to manage.
2. IMP in Theory
The IMP, as conceived by Central Office, would perform the
following functions: eliminate deficits; make management accountable
for their actions by "elevating (the) managerial accountability of
field directors";29 monitor progress towards agency goals; and
facilitate communication within a decentralized agency. According to
65
Central Office, the IMP is first and foremost a decision--making
plan and not a monitoring or reporting device. The. IMP would make
it possible for ''the manager to be clear about what he or she is
supposed to do" in contrast to both DPW and DMH (the Deputy
Assistant Commissioner -of the Office of Administrati've Services whom
I interviewed, came from DMH) where the lack of clear expectations,
plans,and agreements between different organizational levels
resulted in a muddling of the ends to be accomplished and the
appropriate means for accomplishing them. The IMP would make
expectations clear by establishing a minimum level of state-wide per-
formance standards which each manager would be responsible for
attaining. But, within these parameters, each manager is able to
exercise discretion over just how to meet these objectives-- "each
level is empowered to act according to its needs and desires."
3. IMP in Practice: Central and Regional Conferences
Each year, a set of goals is formulated by the Executive
Committee composed of the Commissioner, Assistant Commissioner,
Deputy Commissioner, and the Regional Directors. (In FY 82, for
example, agency goals were essentially the goals mandated by the Lynch
Order.) These goals form the basis for the IMP conferences held
between Central Office and the Regional Directors four times a year.
With each successive IMP during the course of a year, the manager
negotiates performance targets. such that by the end of the period, all
goals have been completely attained,
The FY 83 second quarter IMP between Region IV and Central Office
had as one of its goals "to continue the implementation and monitoring
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of a three-part case review system to ensure: preparation of a
service plan for each consumer based on DSS standards, Performance
of 100% case reviews based on DSS standards. Identification of
children in need of placement plans." 3 0 The Regional Director then
measures the progress he has- made with respect to this goal, progress
wh.ich is indicated by the level of compli ance (with this goal) among
Area Offices in the period from the previous IMP to the current one.
This is. followed by an outline of the. objectives which the Director
will pursue in order to meet the goal in the future: "Region IV will
have full and up-to-date case reviews on 60% of its active clients.
Area Offices will perform full quarterly reviews on all children
five. years and younger who have been in sub-care for more than 18
months.. During the second quarter the Regional Program Staff will
visit each Area Office and monitor what tools are presently used to
monitor case reviews. '31 These objectives are followed by a
description of the indicators to be used in the measurement and
attainment of the objectives.
The Regional Director then submits this written document to
Central Office which distributes it among various divisions--Programs,
Administrative Services, and Human Resources--for review. If there
are disagreements about numbers such as case counts or service
delivery figures, these are revised. This is followed by the actual
IMP conference in which the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, and
the Regional Director meet face-to-face for two to three hours to
discuss the "merits, accuracy, and reasonableness of the IMP,"32 The
regional Director's performance is checked against the agency's yearly
goals, and specifically against the objectives he set for himself in
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the previous IMP. He is responsible for explaining why he has not
reached the objectives he had set for himself, and in this: way both
the managers performance as well as progress towards agency goals are
monitored simultaneously. If it should be. the case that a manager
exhib-its an "unacceptable pattern of management default", 3 3 dismissal
is, indicated.
What transpires during this conference is a series of negotiations
in which the Regional Director attempts to enlarge his "window of
dis.cretion"--the area in which he is free to determine the way in
which he will implement the yearly goals. For instance, one goal might
b.e a reduction in the number of children in residential care, (part
of the agency mission to keep families together) but the Director
might not have been able to reduce his numbers enough to satisfy the
Commissioner. He then justifies his action by arguing that his Region
has more white upper-middle class consumers who demand residential
care, and because DSS is designed to respond to the needs of the
community, it has the obligation to provide this kind of care. The
Director might also argue that residential care is often the only
solution for deeply troubled kinds and thus is a necessity. This
face-to-face negotiation culminates in a final management plan agreed
upon by both the Commissioner and the Director, and this document
guides the Director's actions for the next quarter. This Director,
who was a member of the initial DSS planning team and has had a long
history in the field of ch.ild welfare, is hindered in only 10% of what
he does. His ability to carve o.ut an arena of discretion and to
initiate and defend his actions are the result of his personal power
and prestige within DSS as well as. his expertise in ch.ild welfare. Not
68
all Regional Directors fair as well in the process.
4, Evaluation
The, Regional Director had much praise for th.is system of
management which contrasts so strikingly with the '"crisis management"
so prevalent at DPW, The opportunity to negotiate objectives and
performance targets as well as the ample opportunity to plan (due to
the need to accumulate valid information on a quarterly basis) and to
make one.'s case to Central Office, were the most highly valued
components. This Director, however, did not like the tendency towards
the standardization of Regions--"if they do it in that Region, why
can't you do it here?" The amount of paperwork associated with the IMP
process can also be formidable, and the IMP forms, distributed by
Central Office to obtain the minimum amount of information necessary
to discuss the issues, can change with each IMP depending on what
information Central wants to collect. The Regional Director also has
the option of submitting additional forms and figures of his own.
Central Office has also been pleased with the IMP process but worries
about its time consuming nature as well as its tendency to focus too
narrowly on major objectives to the detriment of on-going operations.
5. IMP in Practice: Regional and Area Conferences
This same process is repeated between the Regional and the Area
Directors on a quarterly basis. While it is the case that the Regional
IMPs are most important, (-in the sense that the Regional Directors
remain free to move resources around the Region regardless of what
is negotiated) Area IMPs provide the Director with valuable inform-
ation about the Areas which he can then incorporate into his Regional
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IMP. While the Regional Director sets the agenda in the sense that
he has his goals in the same way that Central has theirs, "the. agenda
can be negotiated."
We will look at an example of the IMP process in the. Waltham
Area. In general, the Area IMPs focus on program expansion, and in
the case. of Waltham, the Area Director prepares for her IMP by
documenting the kinds of needs the Area has; if, for example, the.
Area needs more staff, she will focus on caseload and types of cases,
The documentation of need--"the building of a case"---for more
residential group care is always difficult because it conflicts with
agency policy of serving children in their homes and reducing the use
of substitute care. In this instance, the Area Director would compile
statistics supporting her request. This Director has had a long
tenure with DSS (and substantial Central Office experience), and
like the Regional Directoris knowledgeable about child welfare.
These two qualities, experience and knowledge, impart considerable
confidence to the Area Director and contribute to her strength and
power. She views the IMP as a means of initiating change and mustering
support for her plans--"as an opportunity to get together to see what
it is you're managing gives you more power--these are my problems,
this is what I need to change. The IMP is the most important thing
that has happened to this agency."
The IMP becomes a tool of power for the Area Director and a means
of improving the. effectiveness of service delivery when it is used
to muster the resources necessary to respond to Area needs, The
budget is also a potent tool primarily because the budget process is
area-based, The Area develops, a budget request which is submitted
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to the Region in May and negotiations ensue, The Area Plan and the
Area Board gives the Director power in the budget process, The,
Area Plan is an invaluable source of information for the Director
wh.o treats it as a living document and uses it to justify her
claims, and actions to the Region--"the Plan says that we need x amount
of service", The Area Board, because it is responsible for documenting
community needs, can easily galvanize community support for the budget
request, Yet, larger constraints exist, One example is the continual
request for more staff, a request which has been largely ignored in
part because Central Office wanted additional staff to come through
legislative appropriation rather than from other Area Offices.
The Area Director did concede that the IMP cuts both ways; it is
a means of control as well as power; other Area Directors who are not
as aggressive feel that they are being controlled through the IMP
process which they view as a device to monitor their compliance with
agency directives.
An important component of the IMP process is the Financial
Management System (FMS) which complements the IMP by providing
managers with the kind of financial data they need to maintain
spending within appropriate levels. The FMS fosters managerial
accountability by indicating the amount of resources available,
and thus enables a comparison to be made between actual and targeted
spending. That is, if one is. aware of the resources available, one
can be held accountable for deficilts, And the elimination of deficits--
4.5 million accumulated under DPW---lay behind the development of the
FMS. The development of an accural or incurred system organized on a
service specific basis gives the manager ample information on present
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and future resources by indicating over or under consumption of
resources, thus allowing for planning,
More specifically, an Internal Spending Plan (ISP) is formulated
whi.ch prQvides data on current and projected financial performance for
the year, Its main advantage is its up-to-date information on
projected expenses. This best estimate of projected fiscal year
expenses is then comapred with the predetermined and approved ISP, and
the comparison indicates how well the manager is doing accordi'ng to
plan, thus facilitating control of costs and promoting effective
management of resources.
The only difficulty with the FMS is its reliance on internal
discipline; it is still possible to pay the bills without doing the
FMS forms. The FMS also requires additional staff and staff is
nearly always in short supply.
Both the IMP and the FMS have thus far been the most effective
and well-received of the techniques under discussion. They have
provided managers with the information and responsibility necessary to
eliminate deficits and to engage in long and short-term planning, both
of which have improved the overall quality of management. In addition,
managers are very positive about the IMP and the FMS which have
encouraged managers to become more active participants in agency
operations.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. ASSIST
In its most general form, the ASSIST case documents the series of
difficulties encountered by DSS in developing and implementing its
computer system, difficulties which have their origin in organizational
behavior, politics, and structure. As such, the ASSIST case is a fine
example of the problems and dilemmas which result from the interaction
between a computerized management information system and a particular
organization. Indeed:
The introduction of a sophisticated information technology
is as much an emotional human problem that requires inter-
personal competence (as well as technical competence) and that
requires knowledge about human aspects of organizations
such as personality, small groups, intergroups, and living
systems of organizational norms.1
The three major bodies of actors--Central Office, Field Management, and
Social Workers--each offers a different explanation for the difficult-
ies. Indeed, the divergent explanations are conditioned by each
group's particular relationship to the computer systemand more gener-
ally, to the agency as a whole.
Central Office: As mentioned previously, Central Office is the primary
user of ASSIST and has thus far been the most pleased with its per-
formance. It is the opinion of Central Office that the major difficul-
ties ASSIST has encountered are essentially technical--slow response
time and the sheer newness of the hardware and the accompanying forms.
These problems have alienated the staff somewhat from ASSIST, but
they will be resolved in due time.
Moreover, according to Central Office, the fact that the new and
complex Standards of Practice are reflected in the computer system has
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created the misperception that ASSIST is Systems rather than user
driven, which has caused some resistance. Finally, ASSIST has
standardized certain aspects of administration and service delivery
which -has caused resistance and resentment among those managers whose
freedom has been impinged upon.
Field Management: Field management, also primary users of the computer
system, feel that ASSIST has failed because it was not designed with
field operations in mind; the overriding concern was Central Office's
need for information to comply with government -reporting requirements.
This situation resulted from a lack of explicit goal formulation, a
lack exacerbated by the indeterminancy of Programs, which did not know
what information it wanted to collect. The negative reaction which
ASSIST has engendered among some field managers thus stems neither
from its newness nor from the staff's fear of technology, but rather
from its uselessness and inconvenience.
Social Workers: Social workers, designated as the secondary users of
ASSIST, were to derive indirect benefits because they would not use
information for decision-making as would Central Office and Field
Maragement. However, they have experienced ASSIST more as data collect-
ors than as data users, and this has given rise to their perception of
ASSIST as a tool which managment uses to monitor both
the agency and their individual performance. Moreover, the fact that
social workers have as of yet derived so few benefits from ASSIST has
led them to locate its failure in the design and implementation process,
a process in which they feel they were not adequately represented, if
not altogether excluded. The inadequacy of the user participation
process resulted in ASSIST not being as useful to them as it might
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have been and also prevented the design of ASSIST from corresponding
to the nature of their work life. The training process and the
difficulty of communicating problems and concerns, coupled with the
absence of any substantial response to their problems, has left them
with the feeling of having been ignored and of being, ultimately, of
no consequence.
The common thread which emerges from these disparate explanations
is their detection of the same phenomenon underlying the dysfunctions
of ASSIST, namely the breakdown of user participation; and this
breakdown has expressed itself in the bestowal of benefits on one
user group at the expense of the others. Ironically, the original
blueprint of ASSIST was replete with user participation mechanisms,
the benefits of which are well known yet warrant recital: 1) more
accurate assessment of user information requirements; 2) prevention
of costly systems features that are unacceptable to users; and
3) greater acceptance and support of the system and greater user
understanding. In addition, user participation is the most beneficial
when it occurs in the initiation and design phases--prior to
implementation--because of the importance of user influence in
determining the scope of the system.2 The process by which the
collapse of user participation occurred will first be reconstructed;
then this process will be situated within the broader organizational
context, a context determined in large part by behavior, politics,
and organizational structure.
The failure of user participation or the "user-driven" approach
in the development of ASSIST can be located precisely in this early
initiation and design phase. The decision to have a computer system
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had already been made at the time of the founding of DSS, as indicated
by the legislative mandate, and some crucial design decisions were
then made in the Five Year Plan, such as the area-based and on-line
features. When the first module was being developed, Programs, which
had been crippled by a lack of leadership coupled with domination by
the Legal Department, was unable to provide the guidance necessary to
develop the consumer modules. Thus the goal of this module--what is
it that we want to know and in what form--was not made explicit as the
service delivery model had not yet been fully articulated in the
Standards of Practice. And in the earlier stages of the Department
there was some ambivilence about precisely how DSS' field practice
would differ from that of DPW.
Programs led the user group, which in adition to being dominated
by Central Office staff who had by and large did not have the exper-
ience with field operations, also lacked the technical expertise
necessary to be influential in the design process. The design unit
which was designated to play the role of "translator" began to exercise
greater control over the design process and proceeded to make
fundamental decisions about the consumer module, decisions which were
made in the absence of solid knowledge of child welfare and thus had
significant operational implications. First and foremost, the
individual was selected as the unit of analysis. Yet the relevant
unit in child welfare is the family, and the purpose of OSS is
precisely to strengthen family life. Second, the mode of data entry
was based on linearity, and designed for the entry of data events
"just as they happen." This conflicts both with social work practice
and with the usual chronology of cases, which follow a different tempo.
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Moreover, the decision to include data to fullfill government reporting
requirements created an "overload" which eventually filled up the core
of the computer and slowed down the system.
The decisions were approved by the Regional and Area Directors
who did not see the implications until the module was implemented, at
which point it became obvious that ASSIST was not sufficiently tailored
to the needs of field operations. But once the decisions had been
iiiplemented it was virtually impossible to rectify the situation
short of redesigning the entire system, and the amount of time and
money which had already been invested made this an unlikely possibility.
The User Committee was also unable to respond to any of the major
difficulties--burdensome paperwork, invalidity of output reports,
update problems--in an aggressive way. The Committee was effectively
transformed into a body which merely reacted to System's directives;
as such it had the patina of user participation but not the substance,
and thus performs merely a legitimating function. The impotence of the
User Committee, coupled with the paucity of social worker participation
in the development and design of ASSIST, has served to deepen social
workers' skepticism, hostility, and resistance towards ASSIST and
towards computerization in general.
In order to explain why events unfolded as they did it is essential
to look at the organizational context within which ASSIST developed, a
context laden with complexity, and historical particularity, and which
ultimately shaped its fate. The factors which have been crucial in
fashioning this context can be grouped under the following headings:
behavior, politics, and organizational structure.
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1. Behavior
Central Office: As described in the Introduction, the origins of DSS
were rooted in the desire to radically transform the way social services
were organized and delivered in Massachusetts. DPW had represented all
the negative aspects which had to be overcome; DSS' mission and organiza-
tional structure as well as the decision to have a computer system
were the products of this antipathy. The selection of Mary Jane
England, a psychiatrist and Associate Commissioner of the Department
of Mental Health, as Commissioner of DSS, over John MacManus, the
Assistant Commissioner and Director of Social Services at DPW, "marked
a clean break with past history, in which child welfare and public
welfare had been closely associated, and in which professional social
workers provided the leadership in child welfare services." This break
with DPW and the social work community in general became even more
clear when prominent members of Central Office were recruited either
from the Department of Mental Health or outside DPW altogether. The
only expert in child welfare was John York, who later became the
Director of Region IV.
The new turn that was so consciously taken had two important
consequences. First, the Central Office staff from DMH were imbued
with a mental health model ofchild welfare. In this model the
individual was the relevant unit of treatment; the model of treatment
and service delivery which these individuals carried with them and
utilized in their practice was essentially that of DMH. Secondly, the
majority of Central Office staff had relatively little contact with
field operations, which made it difficult for them to understand both
the field management perspective and the service delivery process;
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the fact that Central Office was so heavily represented in Systems
development meant that it was their perspective which dominated the
process and which ultimately determined which set of user needs would
predominate. In essence, the computer had been imposed from above, in
the same way as the mission and structure had been, in the hope of
radically restructuring the DPW legacy. As such, ASSIST was deeply
rooted in the initial concpetion of DSS, and as we shall see, came to
reproduce the dilemmas associated with this conception. This concep-
tion of organizational reform prevented Central Office from gaining a
more complete understanding of the work processes of both field
management and social workers.
In addition, those members of Central Office who had been
recruited from DPW still carried the centralized DPW model in their
heads and had not fully come to grips with the fact that DSS was an
area-based system in which the Region, but especially the Area, were
the cornerstones of the service delivery process, a process in which
both field management and social workers figured prominently. Hence
these individuals continued to operate in the centralized mode of DPW,
in which Central Office made the crucial decisions. All of these
factors undermined "user participation" from the very start; users,
other than Central Office, were misconstrued and misunderstood. The
past experience and behavior of Central Office effectively created
barriers to the understanding of the needs and requirements of other
organizational users.
Social Workers: Social Workers have traditionally viewed their
profession as a humanistic one, which means client-oriented and, more
specifically, clinical. In the case of social workers at DSS, this
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perspective has made them resistant to those initiatives which
interfere with their ability to provide the kind of client-oriented
services within which their professionalism is grounded. The
computer system interferred with their professionalism for two reasons.
First, they perceive ASSIST as a means of monitoring and supervising
their activity which hampers their professional discretion. Second,
the standardization and the paperwork that accompanied ASSIST has
threatened the "human" element of their profession--working with
individual clients--which they view as the core of social work activity.
These attitudes have given rise to an aversion to the computer system,
and when this proclivity was combined with inadequate training and
operational problems, the initial behavior was merely reinforced.
2. Politics
The political context within which ASSIST was inserted was
particularly tense, due to DSS' troubled history of labor management
relations. This tension had its origins back in the initial planning
(1980) stages when DSS decided to "professionalize" its work force--
by requiring Master's Degrees for supervisors and Bachelor's Degrees
for social workers--in order to overcome the incompetence it believed
was so pervasive in DPW. To achieve hiring discretion, DSS fought the
grandfathering clause whereby DPW workers would be guaranteed jobs in
the new Department. To this end DSS make it mandatory for each DPW
worker to fill out a nineteen page application called the Human Resource
Inventory, this within a weeks time. The "Inventory created enormous
resentment on the part of the workers, 82% of whom passed the Inventory
and were hired by DSS, much to the surprise of management. "3 The whole
affair left a bitter stamp on labor-management relations and hindered
80
the kind of changes that DSS management was committed to making. On
the one hand, Central Office clearly wanted social workers to adapt
their behavior to the new DSS philosophy, yet it did not respect the
expertise and knowledge that they brought with them from DPW as was
made clear during the Human Resource Inventory episode which enraged
long-time DPW workers. "Their major complaint was that DPW workers
were being subjected to a much more searching, and, in their view,
demeaning investigation than applicants coming from outside with much
less experience. It was proof to them that the DSS leadership placed
no value on their knowledge, experience, and competence."4 This
rendered Central Office insensitive to both the needs and problems of
workers. The social workers, on the other hand, were rather hostile
towards DSS, which made them less inclined to cooperate with the
Department on many of the new initiatives it was developing.
The manner in which ASSIST was introduced by management, and its
subsequent reception by social workers partook of these conflicts,
conflicts which helped to undermine ASSIST's success. Management
for its part did not really understand how workers actually did their
jobs, but was primarily concerned with how they ought to do them, and
thus proceeded to impose a system from above with inadequate worker
input, which implicitly denied the importance of user participation.
This initial mistake was compounded by the nature of the training and
implementation process, which did not succeed in familiarizing all
workers with ASSIST hardware. When workers began to complain about
ASSIST and its attendant paperwork, management did not respond
seriously to these complaints--"workers always complain." Yet,
management was also constrained by the design of ASSIST from
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substantially altering the amount of paperwork. This would have
required radical alterations in the computer system as a whole. Social
workers in turn were unwilling to give ASSIST the benefit of the doubt
when it began to have technical and operational difficulties; they saw
it as a management tool. imposed on them offering few benefits, if any.
The other set of power relations which affected the development and
implementation of ASSIST were those between field managers and Central
Office, a story which will be described in more detail very shortly.
For now, it suffices to say that field managers were able to gain some
autonomy vis d vis the Center in terms of administration and case
practice. ASSIST interferred with this freedom by standardizing and
centralizing power, hence was resisted by those managers who were
powerful, managers who already felt that they did not have sufficient
influence over the ASSIST process, feelings which of themselves already
constituted enough of an incentive not to wholeheartedly support ASSIST.
Finally, Central Office in general, and the Office for Systems
in particular, found themselves in a position where they had invested
so much effort and money in ASSIST that its success became crucial to
their authority and legitimacy. Thus, when operational difficulties
surfaced, the substantive problems underlying these could not be
addressed without jeopardizing the entire project. This made the Office
for Systems weary of real user participation, led to the emasculation
of the User Committee, and thus virtually inhibited the ability of
ASSIST to respond to criticisms and proposed changes.
3. Structure and Organization
The organizational structure of DPW was very centralized, with
budget, personnel, and policy all concentrated at Central Office.
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Central Office, meanwhile, had no direct-line authority over the Area
Offices who, although having neither budget nor personnel authority,
were not really accountable to Central for their actions and thus were
able to exercise considerable discretion with respect to the implement-
ation of Central's policies.
DSS, as we know, had a decentralized structure based on the Region
and the Area; policy was to be formulated in Central Office, and the
Regions and Areas were to be given personnel and budget authority, thus
providing them both with the incentive to manage and implement Central's
policies. However, during the first year of operations, Central Office
did not succeed in gaining the degree of control and direction desired
partly because of the absence of a Deputy Commissioner whose function
it was to link Center and Periphery. 5 This lack of mediation created a
split between Central Office and the field, which when coupled with the
absence of uniform procedures, allowed the field to develop individual
ways of doing business.
We have already observed the Center-Periphery split in terms of
ideology and experience. Top Central Office staff were motivated by an
ideology based upon the rejection of the philosophy and operations of
DPW which DSS was to radically alter. The manner in which these alter-
ations and reforms were to be formulated and executed partook of a
particular conception of change in which the reforms were to be imposed
from above. This conception was coupled with the fact that these
individuals had backgrounds in either the Central Office of DMH or DPW
and thus lacked field experience. These impediments to understanding
the field were aggravated by the tense nature of labor management
relations. Indeed, the tension was partly responsible for the inclina-
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tion, on the part of Central Office, to impose change from above. This
split was clearly exacerbated by the organizational strucutre of DSS.
When ASSIST was introduced, it both reflected and reproduced this
separation and its attendant difficulties, most notably expressed in
the structure of the user participation process--specifically the
User Committee, which became the institutionalized expression of this
cleavage.
The organizational structure also greatly influenced the manner in
which the feedback mechanisms and process were designed and structured.
The amount of discretion exercised by the Regional Office in the design
of systems of feedback, channels of communication, and choice of
representatives to review panels and committees, did lead to the
under-representation of direct service workers in Region IV. Moreover,
these channels, especially in Region IV, were most accessible to Area
Directors and Supervisor IIs than to social workers; Area Directors and
Supervisor Is participated in monthly meetings which were also used
as forums for feedback on systems issues. Moreover, there was no
guarantee that the content of these meetings would be communicated to
Area staff. Thus, the area-based structure imposed certain
constraints on the possibility of communication, there is no certainty
whether information will actually get to workers or whether they will
be able to communicate with the Region or the Center. This has been
the source of some frustration for workers.
This analysis would be incomplete without a discussion of the
rather dramatic effects that ASSIST has, in turn, had on the structure
of DSS. First, ASSIST has caused some recentralization of decision-
making authority in Central Office; this has manifested itself in the
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following ways. The computer forms have standardized the collection and
dispersion of information and have exerted pressure for uniform
administration and case practice procedures. The decision-making
power .of field managers with respect to administrative forms and
procedures was in part removed from them and placed in the Central
Office for Systems. Moreover, there has been a shift in the location
of decision-making towards the Center due to the prominence of the
computer and the concentration of technical expertise in the Office for
Systems.
Secondly, ASSIST has introduced a degree of rigidity into the
decision-making process because the cost of computer change is so high
and the reprogramming of interdependent systems so difficult. All
changes must be closely scrutinized: "There is a strong motivation to
build a protective wall around the new systems, allowing only
"qualified people" to make "authorized changes." 6
Finally, ASSIST has increased the degree of control which Central
management can exercise over both field management and the labor force
because of its role as a monitoring device. Workers feel that Regions
and Areas can more readily survey their actions; likewise, field
management worries that Central can more easily monitor its activities.
Indeed, ASSIST began to play this role more explicitly during the Lynch
Order: "As managemnet becomes more sophisticated about monitoring
compliance and new management tools become available to it, it will
manage more effectively, and the degree of compliance will improve." 7
On the one hand, ASSIST has been moulded by the organizational
strucutre of DSS, a structure characterized by a cleavage between
Center and Periphery. Because of this cleavage, ASSIST has been unable
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to succeed at supporting area-based service. On the other hand, ASSIST
has accelerated the implicit trend in DSS towards increased centraliza-
tion, a trend expressed by concentrations of power and expertise in the
Central Office.
B. Standards of Practice
When DSS became operational, one of its concerns was to render the
service delivery process more efficient, accountable, and effective.
And the Standards of Practice, traditionally not conceived as a tool
through which service delivery is managed, have assumed this function
in, DSS. I would suggest that these Standards are the major means by
which DSS seeks to manage the services delivery process in such a way
as to obtain efficient and effective service.
1. Efficiency
The quest for cost-effective and efficient service delivery had
prompted an attempt by DSS to measure the unit cost of service which
includes the cost of the service itself and the cost of the case
manager. In order to measure the cost of the case manager, it is
necessary to calculate the amount of time a social worker spends on
each case event (equivalent to billing out one's time), a measure
which depends on workload standards which have not yet been formulated.
However, in the absence of workload standards, DSS has discovered
alternative methods of promoting efficient service delivery. One
popular method has been the contracting out of services (other than
51A investigations and care and protection petitions) to private
providers, whom it is believed, have both the expertise and economies
of scale to offer quality service at less cost. DSS provides case
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management whereby the social worker manages (in contrast to DPW
where Central Office was responsible for case management) the service
delivery process by preparing complete assessments and service plans;
monitoring the service quality provided through private provision
and making all relevant service determinations, e.g. length of stay in
placements;and watching for duplication of service. The Standards are
central to this process. Indeed, the Standards define the role of the
social worker as case manager whose function it is to allot different
services to clients and also coordinate, plan, .and oversee all aspects
of a case. Moreover, the Standards provide a detailed set of guidelines
by which this allotment of services is to proceed.
2. Effectiveness
As was made clear in Chapter II, it is very difficult for human
service agencies to measure their effectiveness or the degree to which
they have been successful in meeting their goals. In the case of DSS,
these goals are the prevention of child abuse and neglect, the strength-
ening of the biological family, and the promotion of permanancy plan-
ning. The outputs that are measurable--the number of children returned
home, the number of adoptions completed, and compliance with service
and case reviews--do not indicate the degree to which these goals have
actually been fullfilled, nor do they comment on the quality of these
efforts. Of course, it is possible to ascertain the number of adoptions
that have failed or the incidence of child abuse in families which have
received support services, but it is almost impossible to measure such
things as whether or not children left in their biological families are
happier, or whether prevention has been successful. And the absence
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of this "objective" information--difficult to obtain because of the
problems associated with the tracking the progress of clients, which
even if possible, would still leave unresolved the measurement
dilemma--has increased the tendency to focus on outputs or internal
criteria.
Effectiveness/success begins to depend on the degree of training
that staff receive and the overall quality of their work. In this way,
compliance with the Standards, because they guide field practice by
establishing a minimum level of quality, become a substitute for
effectiveness. The importance that is subsequently placed on the
quality of case management and worker performance leads to an emphasis
on rule following and compliance, both of which breed an excessive
concern with technical means and secondary objectives--a typical form
of displaced behavior.
This emphasis on outputs, performance, and compliance has
contributed to the feeling among social workers that their professional-
ism is being undermined, and has therefore had a deleterious effect on
their morale. The definition of the social worker as a case manager
who specifically does not do clinical work without supervisory
permission, has served to undercut the core of social workers'profes-
sionalism which rests on their clinical as opposed to their case
management skills. The detailed nature of the Standards effectively
removed social workers' discretion over the service delivery process,
discretion which DSS management did not want to grant them because of
its desire to fundamentally alter the work process. The system of
supervision has essentially had the same result. Perhaps if social
workers had been able to participate more fully in the formulation of
88
the Standards as opposed to merely sitting (being represented) on
Regional review panels and commenting on them, the feelings of
deprofessionalization may have been avoidable. A more participatory
process would increase the likelihood that the Standards would reflect
the social workers' conception of their work practices and profession-
alism. Finally, the Legal Department's interference with social
workers' decisions to file care and protection petitions which has
been justified on the basis of the promotion of Departmental goals, is
an invasion of their professional domain within which they are entitled
to make these "clinical" decisions.
These feelings of resentment coupled with the hardships imposed
by the documentation required by the Standards and ASSIST, have made it
more, not less, difficult for social workers to deliver services
efficiently and effectively.
C. Internal Management Plan
The Internal Management Plan (IMP) shares many of the same attrib-
utes as management by objectives:
The system of management by objectives can be described
as a process whereby the superior and subordinate managers
of an organization jointly identify its common goals, define
each individuals major area of responsibility in terms of
the results expected of him and use these measures as guides
for operating the unit and assessing the contribution of
each of its members. 8
Yet, unlike this description of MBO, the IMP focuses less on the joint
identification of goals and more on the mutual definition of responsib-
ilities, clarification of expectations, and measurement of results.
And, in general, the IMP has been judged a success by the managers
interviewed precisely because of the elements of participation and
negotiation, elements which have allowed managers to feel that they
89
are contributing to the running of the agency and thus have managerial
autonomy and responsibility. This participation has allowed them to
more easily internalize organizational goals, as it contributes to the
feeling of unity between the individual and the organization, and this
is quite important given the fact that DSS is a new agency. The
participatory process has also aided managers in assimilating the
demands of the new environment more rapidly due to their involvement
in shaping that environment. Final.ly, the IMP has improved the quality
of their management as it enabled them to accomplish objectives on a
short-term basis, has clarified these objectives, and has made planning
possible.
We have also observed a substantial difference between Regional
and the Area IMP. The Area IMP plays a less significant role in overall
decision-making and goal formulation, and concentrates instead on the
actual service delivery process--expansion of services, budgeting, and
purchase of service. The Regional IMP, while it makes a significant
contribution to the formulation of agency goals and has important
decision-making functions within the Department, remains more of a
monitoring device than a decision-making plan; the Regional IMP
monitors Regional and Area compliance with agency goals for the Central
Office, and in this way the Regional and Area IMPs become a way for
the Center to indirectly monitor the Area. The monitoring function of
the IMP became clear during the Lynch Order when it became a means to
monitor compliance with the Order, yet it performed this function even
earlier according to an observer of the 1980 period: "The reports
submitted for Central Office scrutiny provided the basis of evaluation
assessment of Regional operations....IMP represented new oversight
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mechanisms used to review Area operations."9 Central Office is the
most powerful participant in the process because of the fact that it
controls the kind of information that will be discussed by requesting
that forms be completed on specific topics such as the number of
children in placement, cost sharing, and case review activities; in
essence, Central Office sets the agenda. As the Assistant Deputy of the
Office of Administrative Systems said jokingly, "he who controls the
forms controls the system."
It must be concluded that while the IMP has been positively
evaluated by managers, its success as a tool for the promotion of
self-management, innovation, communication, and participation is as much
the result of the power and personality of the managers interviewed as
the structure of the IMP itself. Indeed, the structure of the IMP,
precisely because it is participative, engages the manager and
encourages the exercise of discretion providing managers with their
opportunity to use the power they have. These managers, due to their
knowledge and strength, have turned the IMP to their advantage and use
it to enlarge their sphere of autonomy and discretion thereby resisting
domination. Indeed, the IMP may not be so effective at fostering
cooperation organizational unity precisely because the element of
power looms so large. Successful management for Regional and Area
Directors is dependent upon the flair and skill with which they
advocate their position--build their case--such that they increase
their chance of getting what they want. Moreover, it is quite con-
ceivable that managers will withold damaging information to make a
better impression. 10
In brief, the IMP has not really brought the kind of organizational
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ransformation envisioned by advocates of MBO whereby power is shared
equally throughout the agency and complete self-management prevails.
Central Office remains the major decision-maker and the IMP is a useful
tool that enables Central to track the progress of program goals like
pennanancy planning and.case reviews. Yet, the difficulty of
measuring DSS goals like prevention has lead to a reliance on numbers
which substitutes for the success of the objectives, and a manager
may not always be able to quantify his successes, e.g. the results of
the expansion of day care is not easy to determine. Also, the stated
objectives may not in fact be the real ones, and the manager may be
offering services which are expensive when the real goal is to save
money.
One positive last word--the IMP has, within these constraints,
been well received and has given managers the ability to respond to
specific conditions; as such it has helped DSS to cope with an uncertain
and turbulent environment.
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V. CONCLUSION
Your literary men and your politicians, and so do the
whole clan of the enlightened among us, essentially differ
in these points. They have no respect for the wisdom of
others, but they pay it off by a very full measure of
confidence in their own. With them it is a sufficient motive
to destroy an old scheme of things because it is an old one.
As to the new, they are in no sort of fear with regard to the
duration of a buil.ding run up in haste, because duration is no
object to those who think little or nothing has been done before
their time, and who place all their hopes in discovery.
Edmund Burke
Reflections on the Revolution in France
1. The Failure of Rational Form
The Department of Social Services introduced ASSIST, the Standards,
the IMP and decentralization as part of its effort to radically reform
and transform the DPW legacy into a new organization. They were one
set of tools to be used to implement the organization's new philosophy
of permanency planning, prevention, entitlement, and decentralized
community-based care. The state of the art computer with its on-line
feature and ability to engage in strategic planning; the clear state-
ments and measurements of objectives; and the detailed and rational
work process were all to contribute to the effectiveness of the new
agency. These generic tools borrowed from the school of scientific
management were to help DSS in its reform efforts by thoroughly re-
orienting and restructuring the management of DSS--making it more
modern, rational, efficient, and accountable--and through its manage-
ment, transforming the agency as a whole.
This conception of organizational change and reform adhered to
by the top management of DSS--reform draped over the organization
from above independent of the context and tradition of the way of life
below--is very much in the "enlightenment" tradition of reform in which
93
social structures are perceived as infinitely malleable and amenable
to rational change introduced from above or outside. Both the
techniques used to implement this conception of reform--monitoring,
performance standards, and program planning--and the method of
implementation in which top managers were responsible for planning,
organizing, and controlling the work process while workers abdicate
their discretion in these matters to management, is central to the
spirit of scientific management. According to Frederik Taylor, the
father of scientific management:
It is only through enforced standardization of methods,
enforced adoption of the best implements and working
conditions, and enforced cooperation that this faster work
can be assured. And the duty of enforcing the adoption of
standards and of en forcing this cooperation rests with the
management alone...
We see, within DSS, the convergence between rational reform and
scientific management, both of which are grounded in instrumental
rationality, a view of the world in which the relations between means
and ends is deliberate and logical such that methods are selected
which will most efficiently achieve ends. The selection and
implementation of methods is the prerogative of those experts at the
top who are reputed to have the most comprehensive perspective.
This convergence, as documented in the case studies, resulted
in the partial failure of ASSIST and the Standards of Practice, and
the partial success of the Internal Management Plan in helping DSS
create organizational reform. These successes and failures are
attributable, in all of the cases, to the manner in which the
political, behavioral, structural and normative context of DSS
interacted with the rational reform conception and the techniques
of scientific management such that they themselves came to reflect and
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reproduce the context they were intended to transform. All three
cases illuminate the process of mutual determination whereby the
techniques were both transformed by the organizational context, and
transformed it in turn. This process illustrates the shortcomings
and the significant tensions existing among element of the reform
vision, tensions which are inherent to the conception of rational
reform and scientific management adhered to by DSS management.
ASSIST affords the most interesting example of the dilemmas
associated with rational reform and scientific management. The blue-
print for the introduction of ASSIST was replete with user participa-
tion mechanisms, mechanisms which were to ensure the adaptation of the
computer to the needs of DSS. However, major decisions were made
about ASSIST by the initial planning group within DSS before the user
participation process even got underway. And once the process did
begin, it was inadequate; user participation could not entirely
succeed given the organizational context which prevented it from being
genuine. This context was constituted by the following factors.
The key planning group of the new agency was guided in its work by
the desire to break away from the past by creating a new agency
radically different from that of DPW:
"A prime motivating factor in the Department's development
was the rejection of the philosophy and operations of the
Department of Public Welfare. DSS was to radically change
the meaning and mode of service intervention then existent
in DPW... given the strong ideological drive of the founders,
and their negative assumptions regarding the operation and
professionals associated with the Department of Public Welfare,
the work on developing the organization proceeded with
little reference to the DPW child welfare and social work
community."2
Five members of this initial planning group had backgrounds in the
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Department of Mental Health; other Central Office staff were re-
cruited from the Central Office of DPW or outside DPW altogether, and
many lacked field experience. These two factors--ideology and
experience--led Central Office to act in a centripetal manner and made
them wary of field operations, field management, and social workers,
which they did not entirely understand. These structural impediments
to understanding the field were exacerbated by the tense history of
labor management relations and the conception of social workers as
part of the tainted DPW legacy, both of which conditioned management's
view of labor. Indeed, the tension between management and labor was
partly responsible for the inclination to impose change from above.
This tension was also responsible for the less than positive attitudes
which Central Office and the field held about each other. Finally,
the structural cleavage between Central Office and the field, a
cleavage derived in part from the DPW legacy and widened due to the
factors mentioned above, resulted in a lack of mediation and created
barriers to communication among staff which hindered the implementation
of ASSIST. This was aggravated by the presence of decentralization
which imposed certain constraints on the possibility of communication
between different levels of the organization: there was no certainty
whether information would actually get to social workers or whether
they would be able to communicate with the Region or the Center. In
these ways, the living organizational context of DSS shaped ASSIST,
and ASSIST in turn reflected this legacy--its characteristics,
successes, and failures.
The Standards of Practice were conceived as tools to change
and shape behavior, and like ASSIST were promulgated from above. How-
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ever, the Standards dealing with abuse and neglect, were imposed from
above in response to tremendous outside pressure directed at DSS,
pressure generated by the Gallison Case (prior to the beginning of
DSS yet crucial in its orientation) and, more recently, the Mallet
Case, in which a child in the care of the Department was murdered.
This pressure (public and professional--National Association of Social
Workers) made it crucial for the agency to be detailed and explicit
about abuse and neglect procedures in the field, and to ensure that
all staff immediately complied with them.
The Standards were also influenced by DSS' desire to more
effectively manage the service delivery process by planning,
standardizing, and improving human effort and productivity in order
to maximize output and reduce duplication. Here too, conflicting
demands on the organization became apparent. On the one hand,
Central Office must be accountable to its funding sources by assuring
them that it is delivering only the services needed and doing so at
maximum productivity. On the other hand, the agency must be
accountable to its consumers and the community by trying to deliver
the quantity and quality of services needed. In its attempt to be
accountable to its funders and to promote agency goals by managing
the service delivery process, it imposed performance standards from
above which indirectly monitored and measured the quality and quantity
of services delivered in the field. This also had the secondary
effect of limiting the discretion of social workers, and to a
lesser extent, Area Directors, with respect to service delivery, e.g.
it is an agency goal to reduce the use of residential care, the use
of which is closely monitored, yet clients often require this kind of
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treatment even though it is terribly expensive. While it is
admittedly difficult to devise Standards of Practice and performance
which everyone can agree on, these standards promoted "the one best
way of doing a task" by offering detailed rules and procedures for
their execution. And it was this kind of formulation in conjunction
with the limited participation of social workers in this formulation,
that made them feel their discretion over their work life was being
invaded. This sentiment, coupled with the substantial difficulties
and grueling pressures associated with social work practice, helped
to undermine worker morale and generated some organizational conflict
and divisiveness.
The IMP has met with the kind of approval denied ASSIST and the
standards, precisely because it has partially succeeded in becoming
less of a "technique" and more a form of shared action. IMP's success
is attributable to the fact that it engages itself with the work
life of those who interact with it by encouraging and rewarding
their talents and strengths. Indeed, IMP's emphasis on process expressed
through participation is its most appealing attribute.
Of course, the IMP reflects the organizational structure of DSS
characterized by the cleavage between Central Office and the field,
the product of both the ideology and experience of Central Office as
well as the DWP legacy in which Area Offices exercised discretion
with respect to the implementation of Central Office policies. The
decentralization effort was to cure this latter tendency by giving
Regions and Areas incentives to implement Central policy. In
actuality, decentralization came to resemble deconcentration or the
devolution of administrative responsibility, but not necessarily
98
substantive decision-making power, onto the Regions and Areas. The
IMP was formulated to complement the deconcentration effort by
creating links between Central Office and the field. In this sense,
the IMP reflects deconcentration because it gives field management
responsibility for those decisions which are essentiallyi
administrative. Yet, it has been successful in providing managers
with the incentive to manage by making them participants in some
aspects of the decision-making process, and making them accountable
for their actions. Thus, while the IMP also reflects its
organizational context, it is the only initiative which is helping
to transform one element of that context, namely the Center-
Periphery split, by creating the possibility of mutual communication,
and hopefully understanding.
2. Organizational Effectiveness
The IMP has clearly had the most success in bringing about
organizational effectiveness expressed in the following ways: it has
moved the organization in the same direction, provided incentives for
levels of management to be accountable and implement Central policy,
improved the quality of information available for planning and
decision-making, reduced, if not eliminated, deficits with the help
of the Financial Management System, and improved the ability of DSS to
tailor services to the community. However, the IMP partakes of all
of the problems experienced by management by objectives systems: the
difficulty of measurement such that less quantifiable objectives get
short changes, and the possibility that stated objectives may not be
the real ones. Moreover,
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rational behavior, in the instrumental sense, depends on
understanding objectives with sufficient specificity to
construct behaviors that are consistent with, and supportive
of, their achievement. Yet we frequently cannot even igentify
the authoritative decision-maker in our complex system.
As we have seen, the process of goal setting in DSS has been influenced
by outside sources such as the Lynch Order and the Mallet Case, in
addition to pressure brought to bear by individual consumers,
communities and the State Legislative itself. At the present time,
due to the fact that the State is beginning to experience financial
difficulties resulting from Proposition 2 1/2,.the State legislature
is considering reducing appropriations for the Regional Offices which
are the cornerstones of decentralization and the IMP process. DSS
has very little control over this decision, yet it is a decision that
would have profound effects on the agency.
ASSIST, thus far, has had more limited success in promoting
organizational effectiveness because it has not been equally
beneficial to all of its users in the performance of their tasks,
and has not been entirely successful in supporting area-based service.
In order for ASSIST to become a more effective tool, it must become
more useful to both field managers and social workers. It must
rectify the paperwork burden which has helped to empty the meaningful
content from jobs, and focus more on service delivery rather than
merely on data collection.
At the present time, ASSIST has been instrumental in helping the
agency to acquire crucial information on consumers, information which
it was not able to get prior to the introduction of the computer. In
the future, ASSIST may prove more helpful to top management by
increasing the volume and speed of information, and should allow
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managers to direct the agency in a more detailed way.
However, as stated earlier, ASSIST is both recentralizing power
in Central Office and standardizing elements of administration and
case practice. This will create tension between ASSIST as a tool of
accountability for Central Office, and ASSIST as a tool to aid service
delivery at the Area level. This tension, which may well be inherent
in any computerized information system, may increase if the Office
for Systems is prevented from expanding its current consumer module to
include additional data relevant for service delivery, and from
developing its other modules, a likely possibility given the fact
that Systems was denied 2.5 million dollars by the Committee on Ways
and Means in FY 82. Moreover, the long-term effect of Proposition
2 1/2 and federal reductions on the state budget makes this kind of
future expansion uncertain.
In addition, there is cause to be less than sanguine about the
possibility that information generated by ASSIST, and management
information systems more generally, will promote effeciency and
effectiveness by telling us what we are doing and how we are doing
it. This problem plagues all users of management information
systems in fields such as the human services which confront the
difficulty of translating the values of efficiency and effectiveness
into empirically verifiable and consensual standards. The difficulty
of measurement, if we can in fact agree what it is that is being
measured, may result in the gathering of information that merely
gives the appearance of accountability to both funding sources and
superiors.
The Standards have also recentralized control by giving Central
101
Office the power to define the work process and the system of super-
vision. The Standards have attempted to create effectiveness in the
field by detailing and rationalizing the work process, and as mentioned
earlier, some of the explicitness was a response to external demands
on the agency. Effecti.veness and success depend on the degree of
training that staff receive, training which effects the overall
quality of their work. In this way, compliance with the Standards
can become a substitute for effectiveness. The importance which is
subsequently placed on the quality of case management and worker
performance has led to an emphasis on rule following and compliance,
and compliance with the Standards has helped to promote agency goals
such as permanent planning and the expeditous handling of abuse and
neglect investigations. However, the rigorousness of the Standards,
particularly the accompanying documentation, has imposed hardships
on social workers, and the emphasis on rule following has had the
unfortunate effect of undermining worker morale. Like ASSIST, the
effectiveness the Standards was supposed to engender has been partly
threatened by the very process used to achieve it. While the
Standards have enabled DSS to manage the direct provision of service by
controlling the quality of case management, the agency has much less
control over those services it purchases, thus it is more difficult to
manage these services, i.e. ensure that services purchased are
delivered efficiently. Of course, case managers monitor this process
but the providers themselves exercise both discretion and political
power over their provision of service. Recently, they have become
more vocal in their opposition to the decentralization of the
contracting and negotiation process, and growing audits and
102
regulations. In brief, purchase of service complicates the manage-
ment of the service delivery process.
Given the profound difficulties that DSS has had to confront as
a new agency attempting to cope with the strenuous demands of the
child welfare and social services environments, the amount of
success that it has enjoyed is extraordinary. DSS has eliminated
its deficits, extended services to more consumers, created closer
ties with the community, increased preventive care, and greatly
increased its number of voluntary applications. Specifically, the
IMP has been instrumental in the elimination of deficits, and
decentralization and the IMP together have made the expansion of
service possible by enabling Area Directors to respond to community
needs. The Standards have contributed to the promotion of agency
goals such as permanency planning and the more efficient handling of
abuse and neglect cases through explicit guidelines for field
practice. Finally, ASSIST has made it possible to locate each and
every consumer served by the Department. However, it is no easy
matter to determine the extent to which these successes have been
wrought solely by the techniques under discussion. It must be
conceded that other factors have also contributed to these successes.
The pressure exerted by the Lynch Order was also instrumental in
furthering the permanency planning process, and the Mallet Case led
to the willingness to comply with rigorous abuse and neglect procedures
even though this imposed hardships on everyone involved. But just as
the successes are often partly attributable to outside forces, so
to are the failures. The conflicting demands on the agency imposed
from above (the State legislature, the public and the courts) and
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below (individuals, communities, and providers); the unremitting
financial pressure coupled with the reality of the public provider as
provider of last resort meaning that the neediest individuals turn
to the State for services; and the pervasive conflict among State
agencies over responsibility for clients, are some of the external
factors which themselves act as constraints on the success of even
the most effectively managed agencies by thrusting management into
"crisis management." And crisis management often translates into
immediate policy changes, compliance deadlines, and hardships for
everyone.
3. Lessons
A. General
The case studies provide a few central lessons about the
appropriateness and relevance of scientific management for the human
services in general. First, the introduction of scientific manage-
ment and rational reform from above which does not take into account
the particularity of an organizational context, a context shaped by
history, ideology and politics, will have negative consequences. The
reforms and techniques will be molded and transformed by the organiza-
tion such that they have a result different from that intended, or
they will be foiled by the opponents of the reform. This is not to
say that rational reform is not appropriate but rather that its
success depends on the enlistment of the support of those who it will
affect implying that they must be consulted about the nature and
implementation of the reform effort. This precludes the imposition
of reform from above. Relatedly, no technique is neutral; the success
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or failure of a technique depends on its substance, purpose and
mode of implementation, all of which are influenced by the larger
organizational context.
Secondly, the search for organizational effectiveness through
the use of scientific and rational management techniques is in-
sufficient without the cooperation and participation of those staff
who will use the techniques. Indeed, organizational efficiency and
effectiveness result as much, if not more, from "process" in Likert's
sense--
- delegation of authority and responsibility
- communication which flows verticially and horizontally and is
undistorted
- teamwork and cooperation
- widely dispersed decision-making
- goals established by group participation
- personnel motivated and feels responsible to attaining
organizational goals
- employee development
- trust and integrity
as they do from the application of scientific management and analytic
techniques.
Thirdly, the kind of management skill required in the environment
of the 1980's--increasingly complex, politicized, and inter-
governmental--are not merely those of scientific management but
political and inter-personal skills such as the ability to negotiate,
and technical skills to facilitate the understanding of legislation
and regulation.
Finally, efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability taken in
their usual narrow sense, may not in and of themselves be appropriate
or possible goals for the human services. Measurement and evaluation
are formidable undertakings because human service outcomes are more
105
complex, have far-reaching social and political implications, and are
influenced by a variety of external factors.
B. Specific Recommendations for DSS
1'. DSS would be better served by a different conception of management
which is closely adapted to its specific needs and rooted within
the tradition of child welfare rather than the more generic
scientific management school. Indeed, those managers in Region
IV who experienced the greatest success with the IMP had
extensive experience in the child welfare field. ASSIST should
be more closely adapted to the specific needs of DSS and a genuine
process of user participation would make this possible. This,
in turn, depends on improved organizational communication and
understanding.
2. New forms of communication between Central Office and field
management and social workers should be established. The role of
Deputy Commissioner, which is the mediating link between the
Central Office and the Regions, should be strengthened to ensure
that Regional concerns are communicated to Central Office.
Moreover, social workers need a mechanism through which they can
communicate with Central in the same way as managers have the IMP
process. At the present time, the constraints of a decentralized
system prevent direct communication and this has contributed to
the feeling among social workers that their problems have not
reached Central Office, which, they perceive, correctly or in-
correctly, as the only place powerful enough to offer solutions
to their problems.
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3. Standards of practice and performance should be negotiated
and set jointly between Area Directors and social workers
(this in addition to labor management negotiations) through a
device such as the IMP. This will increase cooperation and
motivation, and will lead to improved worker morale which in
turn will improve worker performance.
4. Involve all levels of the agency in goal formulation, especially
Area Directors, social workers, and Area Boards, who have the
most contact with communities and knowledge of their needs. At
the present time, DSS has been lobbying for more social workers
in order to comply with the Lynch Order and to reduce the
caseload burden on existing workers. The Area Boards, if they
become more directly engaged in goal formulation, could exert
the political pressure necessary to muster the resources
required to achieve this agency goal. Relatedly, DSS should
seek to broaden the notions of efficiency, effectiveness, and
accountability which have been thrust upon it from above
such that effectiveness translates into the ability to respond
to less powerful groups in the community who require services;
accountability becomes social responsibility and not merely a
question of how funds are spent; and efficiency becomes a
measure of overall service quality and accessibility rather than
merely a measure of the relation of input to output.
In its quest for these broader goals, DSS must encourage
community feedback throuqh the Area Boards, and form alliances
with those groups who share its interests and are thus willing to
exercise political clout on its behalf.
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APPENDIX
I interviewed individuals at all levels of DSS - Central, Regional
and Area. Region IV was selected for examination because it was
suggested that I go there by my contact in Central Office. The
Director of Region IV suggested that I look at the Waltham Area Office.
I did not use a standard questionnaire. My technique was to go in
with a few general questions and then probe when necessary, This
strategy, which allowed the interviewee to draw out and describe
the environment in his or her own terms, enabled me to get a quick
feeling for the environment, an environment totally new to me. As
the interviewing process continued, I developed a better sense of
the issues involved and was able to focus more narrowly.
In total, I conducted twenty interviews which averaged 2 1/2
hours a piece. What follows are 3 examples of questionnaires
which were used during the inverviewing process.
A. Rosemary McCrohan, User Laison and Support Unit, Central Office
for Systems
1. Discuss the background of ASSIST and the Office for Systems.
Why was ASSIST developed and what were the deficiencies of
DPW?
2. Describe Central Office responsibilities for the development of
ASSIST, Regional and Area responsibilities.
3. What does ASSIST do? What are its goals? How does it work?
4. Problems or changes and mechanisms for implementing change.
5. Evaluate ASSIST for each group of users--Central, Regional
Management, Social Workers,
6. Impact or organizational structure, the structure of work,
worker morale.
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B. Beth Smith, Central Office of Policy and Programs
Interview I
1. How do the regulations of DSS differ from DPW?
2. How are they formulated and by whom?
3. How do the standards differ from DPW?
4. How are they formulated and by whom?
5. Problems/changes.
6. Impact of standards on work relations.
7. Discuss the relation of the standards to ASSIST and the IMP.
8. Discuss and evaluate the role of ASSIST in the service delivery
process.
Interview II
1. How would you characterize DSS' style of management?
2. What do you mean by output and discuss the problems of
measurement?
3. How do you evaluate agency success and effectiveness?
4. Discuss the impact of the Mallet Case and the Lynch Order on
the service delivery process.
C. Eleanor Dowd, Area Director, Waltham Area Office
1. Describe Waltham.
2. Describe your responsibilities.
3. How much autonomy do you have within DSS?
4. How decentralized is DSS?
5. How important is the Area Office, compared with DPW?
6. Describe the IMP process.
7. How do you prepare for it?
8. Evaluate the IMP.
a. Do you feel it has been successful?
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b. Does it help you to do your job better?
c. In what way do you think it has affected the organizational
structure of DSS?
d. Has it helped in the service delivery process?
e. How effective has it been?
9. Evaluate ASSIST
a. Usefulness.
b. Problems.
c. Impact on Area Office.
10. Describe worker morale--reason for why and how it became that
way.
11. What type of supervision is used in Area Office: Supervisory
or structural?
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